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Public Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis
and Unilateral Change*
Stephen F. Befort**
INTRODUCTION
The brief history of public sector collective bargaining encompasses two periods of economic extreme. Collective bargaiing in the public sector emerged in the 1960's and early
1970's, a period of unprecedented growth in state and local government.1 With normal economic restraints eased by the
growth of state and local budgets, 2 inexperienced public employers frequently offered little resistance to the demands of
public sector unions.3 Beginning in the mid-1970's, however,
*
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** Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The
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Timothy Yuen Wong for their invaluable help as research assistants.
1. The public sector labor force almost doubled between 1960 and 1980,
increasing from 8,353,000 to 16,241,000 during that period. See BUREAU OF LA.
BOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 31 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 45 table
B-1 (Feb. 1984). The coincidental growth of government employment and public sector unionism is described in a number of articles. See, eg., Blair, State
Legislative Control over the Conditions of Public Employment Defining the
Scope of Collective Bargainingfor State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND.
L REV. 1, 5-7 (1973); Horton, Economics, Politics and Collective Bargaining.
The Case of New York City, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS: A STUDY OF THE
CRISIS IN PUBuC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 183, 183-84 (A. Chickering ed.
1976); Weber, Prospectsfor the Future,in LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 3, 4-5 (A. Knapp ed. 1977); Weitzman, The Effect of Economic Restraints on Public-Sector Collective Bargaining: The Lessons of New York
City, 2 EMPLOYEE REL. J. 286, 288 (1977).
2. State and local government expenditures increased from 8A% of gross
national product in 1957 to 13.2% in 1977. COM1r9rEE ON ECONouc DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING MANAGEMIENT OF THE PUBLIC WORK FORCE: THE CHALLENGE TO STATE AND LOCAL GOvERNmENT 28-31, 33 (1978), reprinted in L
EDWARDS, P, CLRK & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBUC
SECTOR 6 (2d ed. 1979).
3. See Weber, supra note 1, at 4-5. Some commentators go so far as to
suggest that public employers "gave away the store" during this period. See,
eg., Sackman, Redefining the Scope of Bargaining in Public Employment, 19
B.C.L. REV. 155, 159 (1977); see also Raskin, Conclusion The CurrentPolitical
Contest, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS: A STUDY OF THE CRISIS IN PUBLIc SEC-
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the economic fortunes of state and local governments suffered a
dramatic reversal. 4 Whether viewed as a cause or an effect of
the fiscal crisis, taxpayer hostility to ever-increasing budgets accompanied and exacerbated the problem. 5 These financial and
political pressures fostered a new aggressiveness among public
TOR LABOR RELATIONS 203, 205-10 (A. Chickering ed. 1976) (describing public

sentiment against concessions to public sector unions in San Francisco and
elsewhere). As an example of the economic gains secured by public sector unions during this period, base pay for police officers rose 174% and health insur-

ance costs for each city employee nearly quadrupled in New York City
between 1969 and 1975. Schnadig, Public Sector Collective Bargaining in
Times of Fiscal Crisis, in LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 203,

208-09 (A. Knapp ed. 1977).
4. New York City provides a vivid example, with a 20% reduction in
workforce and a 21% reduction in total budgetary expenditures during the second half of the 1970's. Anderson & London, Collective Bargainingand the Fiscal Crisis in New York City: Cooperationfor Survival, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
373, 392 (1982). The fiscal crisis was a virtually universal phenomenon, with
budget deficits plaguing a majority of the nation's largest 275 cities during the
1979-1981 period, Public Worker Outlook Austere; Fiscal PressuresAre Mounting, 915 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 26-27 (June 1, 1981), and, during fiscal
year 1982, governments in 44 states resorting to layoffs, Layoffs, RIFs, and
EEO in the Public Sector: A BNA Special Report, GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.
(BNA) No. 949, at 13 (Feb. 8, 1982).
The fiscal crisis has been attributed to, inter alia, inflation coupled with a
general economic recession; reductions in federal revenue sharing; the spiraling cost of providing income maintenance, social, and health services; shrinking tax bases in the Frost Belt; and declining school enrollments. See
AFSCME, PASSING THE BUCKS: THE CONTRACTING OUT OF PUBLIC SERVICES
11-12 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PASSING THE BUCKS]; Jascourt, Collective
Bargainingand the Impact of DecliningEnrollments and Revenues: An Introduction, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 247, 247 (1983); Sachs, Public Sector Unions and Fiscal Crisis, in LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 215, 216-17 (A.
Knapp ed. 1977); Weitzman, supra note 1, at 286. It also has been suggested
that public sector unionism and the resulting high cost of labor were themselves significant causes of the fiscal crisis. See Schnadig, supra note 3, at 203
("The fact is that past failures by public employers in bargaining have been a
major factor in precipitating the urban fiscal crises we now see."). But see Anderson, Local Government-Bargainingand the Fiscal Crisis: Money, Unions,
Politics, and the Public Interes 27 LAB. L.J. 512, 517 (1976) (maintaining that
the cost of labor was not primarily responsible for the fiscal crisis of New
York City).
5. See Sackman, supra note 3, at 159-60; Vaughn & Dozier, Public Sector
Bargaining Issues in the 1980's: A Neutral View, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY 33RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 317, 318-19
(R. Adelman ed. 1980). The adoption of taxpayer-initiated referenda limiting
property tax revenues in California (Proposition 13), CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA,
and Massachusetts (Proposition 2 1/2), MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985), were the best-publicized examples of a nationwide phenomenon that made it "good politics" to oppose union demands.
See Tax-Trimming Measure Passesin Mass.; 6 Other States Nix Similar Referenda, 889 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 12, 12-13 (Nov. 24, 1980).
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sector managers, who sought to reduce personnel costs6 by opposing union demands and attempting to effect retrenchment
measures such as reductions-in-force and wage freezes. 7
These budgetary pressures also forced public employers to
become more attentive to the means by which they could effectuate retrenchment measures. Prior to the fiscal crisis in government, most public employers were not overly concerned
with the process of implementing changes in employment
terms. They usually tended to react to union demands rather
than initiating their own management proposals. The few
courts in this period that considered the procedural context for
implementing management proposals generally adopted private
sector rules without revision.8 These rules prohibit the employer from altering the terms and conditions of employment
without first bargaining to impasse or, if the term in question is
contained in a collective bargaining agreement, from obtaining
the other party's consent to the proposed change.9 To the
newly aggressive public employer, this process frequently was
an obstacle to the implementation of measures considered necessary to contend with the fiscal crisis. Although some public
sector employers and unions successfully used the collective
bargaining process to fashion a mutual response to budgetary
problems,'0 many public sector employers sought instead to expand management's prerogative to act unilaterally.
The attempt by public employers to expand their unilateral
authority presents issues that go to the very core of collective
bargaining in the public sector. Public employers believe that
government in a democratic society must have the ability to respond to a genuine fiscal emergency by taking prompt action in
the public interest. Public sector unions, however, view unilat6. The focus on personnel costs is not surprising since employee wages
and benefits constitute more than 60% of most public sector budgets. See D.
STANLEY, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION PRESSURE 120 (1972)

(payroll costs constitute 60-70% of municipal budgets); Simon, The School Finance Decision Collective Bargainingand FutureFinanceSystems 82 YALE
L.J. 409, 413 (1973) (employee compensation makes up approximately 65% of

public school budgets).
7. See Sackman, supra note 3, at 159-62; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 30203; see also Anderson & London, supra note 4, at 381-84, 409-10 (discussing use

of productivity bargaining, in which wage increases are tied to productivity).
8. See e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 589601, 295 A 2d 526, 538-43 (1972); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit,
391 Mich. 44, 52-57, 214 N.W.2d 803, 807-10 (1974).
9. See infin notes 11-47 and accompanying text.
10. See, eg., PASSING THE BUCKs, supra note 4, at 95-101; Anderson &
London, supra note 4, at 409-10.
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eral employer action, no matter how appropriate in economic
terms, as incompatible with the therapeutic process of good
faith negotiation that serves as a cornerstone of modern labor
relations.
This Article explores the development of unilateral change
rules in public sector collective bargaining. It compares the
public sector rules with the long-standing unilateral change
principles established in the private sector and concludes that
the ability of public employers to effectuate unilateral change
is, in many jurisdictions, much broader than that of their private sector counterparts. The Article then examines whether
this differential treatment is required by the structural and
political process considerations inherent in the public sector or
is merely indicative of lingering notions of sovereignty and "extra loyalty."
I.

UNILATERAL CHANGE IN THE PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC SECTORS

An essential prerequisite to understanding unilateral
change rules in the public sector is a review of the corresponding private sector rules, which generally place a heavy premium on bargaining over proposed changes in the employment
relationship. Although these private sector rules serve as a
starting point for determining public sector rules, courts and
state labor boards have seized upon real and perceived differences between the two sectors to permit a greater degree of
unilateral change in the public sector. The justification for this
differential treatment, however, has become increasingly suspect as public sector employment has become more like that in
the private sector.
A.

THE PRIVATE SECTOR

The statutes and decisions concerning unilateral change in
the private sector underscore the role of bilateral negotiation as
a condition precedent to the adjustment of terms and conditions of employment."' The National Labor Relations Act
11. The rules governing unilateral change in the private sector are relatively well-established. For articles discussing these rules, see Bowman, An
Employer's UnilateralAction-An Unfair Labor Practice?,9 VAND. L. REV.
487 (1956); Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U.
PrIT. L. REV. 1 (1977); Nelson & Howard, The Duty to Bargain During the
Term of an Existing Agreement, 27 LAB. L.J. 573 (1976); Rabin, Limitations on
Employer IndependentAction, 27 VAND. L. REv. 133 (1974); Schatzki, The Em.
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(NLRA) requires employers and labor organizations to bargain
in good faith over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."' 2 As the Supreme Court acknowledged
in NJLB v. Borg-Warner Corp.,13 the duty to bargain extends
only to those mandatory subjects. 14 Although neither party is
forced to make concessions on mandatory subjects,' 5 the parties
are required to bargain in good faith with a present intention to
find a basis for agreement,' 6 and it is an unfair labor practice to
implement a proposal concerning these subjects without first
bargaining to the point of impasse.' 7 Conversely, the parties
have no obligation to bargain over nonmandatory, or permissive, subjects,' s and unilateral action generally is lawful absent
an agreement to the contrary. 19 Finally, the NLRA20 and other
legislation 2 ' prohibit the inclusion in a labor agreement of a
third class of "illegal" subjects; parties may not condition an
agreement on inclusion of such terms even if they relate to
wages, hours, or working conditions. 22
Courts tend to construe the scope of mandatory bargaining
broadly and to limit permissive bargaining subjects to topics
that do not significantly relate to terms and conditions of emplaoyer's UnilateralAct-A Per Se Violation-Sometimes, 44 TE

L. REV. 470

(1966); Stewart & Engeman, Impasse Collective Bargainingand Action, 39 U.

Cni. L. REV. 233 (1970).
12.
(1982);
13.
14.
15.

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
see id. §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3).
356 U.S. 342 (1958).
See i&. at 349.
See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).

16. See NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1943).
17. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-43 (1962).
18. See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349 (stating that with respect to nonmandatory matters "each party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to
agree or not to agree").
19. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680-86
(1981); Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 187-88 (1971).
20. See, e-g., NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (limiting the extent to
which parties may agree to make union membership a condition of
employment).
21. See, eg., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-66
(1965) (union's agreement with employer to impose a certain wage scale on
other bargaining units not immune from Sherman Act).
22. See National Maritime Union (Texas Co.), 78 N.L.RB. 971, 981-82
(1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950),
circuit court opinion cited in Borg.Warner,356 U.S. 342, 360 (1957) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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ployment 23 or that involve managerial concerns going to the
"core of entrepreneurial control. ' '2 4 In FirstNational Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 25 the Supreme Court adopted a somewhat more restrictive balancing test designed to determine
whether decisions that fall within management's control but
that also have an impact on terms and conditions of employment are mandatory bargaining subjects. Specifically, the
Court held that bargaining must occur if the benefit of negotiations to labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the
business by limiting the employer's freedom to act
26
unilaterally.
Although the prevailing unilateral change rules for private
sector bargaining vary depending on the presence or absence of
a collective bargaining agreement, the bargaining obligation
predominates in both contexts. In NLRB v. Katz, 27 a case that
arose in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, the
Supreme Court held that an employer's unilateral implementation of changes in existing wage, sick leave, and merit pay plans
without bargaining with the exclusive representative constituted a per se violation of § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, even in the
absence of bad faith.28 Katz does not completely eliminate the
possibility of unilateral action, however, since either party 29
23. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542, 547-48 (4th
Cir. 1967).
24. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
25. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
26. See id at 679. In applying this test to the facts of First Natl Maintenance, the Supreme Court concluded that an employer need not negotiate
with a certified representative of its employees concerning a decision to close a
portion of its business for economic reasons. See i&i at 686.
The NLRB, in Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 115 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1281 (1984), recently applied a standard providing for a markedly more
restrictive scope of mandatory bargaining. The plurality in Otis Elevator apparently dispensed with the balancing approach of FirstNat'l Maintenance, indicating instead that a relocation decision does not require bargaining unless It
is motivated solely by labor costs. See Otis Elevator, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1282 n.3;
George, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relocation
Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REV.667, 689-91 (1985).
27. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
28. See id at 743.
29. Unilateral change rules technically apply to the conduct of both employers and labor organizations. Of course, employers are more often in a position to effectuate unilateral action, and this Article focuses on their conduct.
A few cases, however, have found that unions that force a change in working
conditions without bargaining violate NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)
(1982). See, e.g., New York Dist. Council No. 9, Int'l Bhd. of Painters v. NLRB,
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may still take unilateral action with respect to nonmandatory
bargaining subjects.3 0 Moreover, even with respect to
mandatory issues, a party, after bargaining to impasse, 31 may
implement "unilateral changes that are reasonably comprehended within [its] pre-impasse proposals." 32
Rules governing unilateral change during the term of a collective bargaining agreement are more complex. In this setting,
the NLRA's preference for the bargaining process must be balanced against the stability afforded by adherence to the bargain
already struck. Section 8(d) states that the duty to bargain described in that section "shall not be construed as requiring
either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms
and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period."
The determinative factor is whether a topic is "contained in"
the contract. If a bargaining proposal seeks to modify a term
contained in the contract, neither party lawfully may insist on
bargaining, and the term can be changed only with the mutual
consent of the parties.34 Even if the topic is not already addressed in the contract, neither party may implement a
mandatory bargaining proposal without first bargaining to impasse.a5 Again, this preference for resolution through bilateral
negotiations is not absolute. Either party may take unilateral
453 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1971) (condemning union's unilateral imposition of
work quota), cert denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972).
30. See FirstNat Maintenance,452 U.S. at 674-75.
31. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has defimed an "impasse" as a
"state of facts in which the parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked." NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 1963).
32. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), rev. denied, 395
F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968), quoted in Newspaper Printing Corp., 232 NJ.LR.B.
291, 308-09 (1977), enforced, 625 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
911 (1981); see Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 64-65 (1964).
33. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
34. See e.g., NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 285 (1957); C & S Indus.,
Inc., 158 N.L.B. 454, 460 (1966).

35. See ag., Int'l Woodworkers Local 3-10 v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 628, 629-30
(D.C. Cir. 1967). In Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enfarced, 196
F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952), a divided NLRB rejected a construction of § 8(d) that
would have eliminated the mandatory bargaining obligation during the contract term. Although one Board member expressed the view that the need for
stability during the contract term warranted only a voluntary duty to bargain,
94 N.L.R.B. at 1231 (Reynolds, M., concurring and dissenting), the plurality
opinion maintained that a mandatory obligation furthered the NLRA's purpose of "encouraging the practice and procedures of collective bargaining." 94

N.LRB. at 1217-18. A contrary result, the plurality explained, would "dissipate" goodwill and remove the escape valve for pressures that otherwise

would result in industrial strife. See id.
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action concerning nonmandatory topics 3 6 and may waive the
right to object to unilateral action concerning mandatory topics
by "clear and unmistakable" language in the bargaining
37
agreement.
The unilateral change proscription also applies to the period following the expiration of a bargaining agreement, during
which time the parties may not alter the status quo concerning
mandatory terms governing the employer-employee relationship without first bargaining to impasse.3 8 The status quo that
the parties must maintain is a dynamic one that encompasses a
past pattern of periodic adjustments. Thus, an employer commits an unfair labor practice by refusing to provide regularly
scheduled wage or merit increases provided in an expired contract unless bargaining results in either a different agreement
or an impasse. 39 This rule is not premised on some notion of
contract extension but rather on the affirmative bargaining ob40
ligation of the NLRA.
The private sector unilateral change rules therefore emphasize collective negotiation as the preferred process for establishing employment terms.41 Consistent with this overriding
36. See, e.g., Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 187-88 (1971); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. No.
162, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281, 1283-84 (1984). In Allied Chemical, the Court
added that unilateral action that modifies a permissive topic contained in the
contract does not violate the NLRA's bargaining obligation but that the permissive term nonetheless could be enforced in an action for breach of contract
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
See 404 U.S. at 181 n.20.
37. Pepsi-Cola Distrib. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 869, 869-70 (1979), enforced, 646
F.2d 1173 (6th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 936 (1982); see BancroftWhitney Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 57, 57-58 (1974).
38. See, e.g., NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 302 (5th Cir.
1980), enforced in part, 641 F.2d 351 (1981); Gordon L. Rayner, 251 N.L.R.B.
89, 90 (1980), enforced as modified, 665 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1982). Contract
terms that govern the employer-union relationship, however, generally do not
survive contract expiration. See Ogden, Arthur & Smith, The Survival of Contract Terms Beyond the Expiration of a Collective BargainingAgreement, 32
LAB. L.J. 119, 121 (1981).
39. See Reed Seismic Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. See Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 138 (8th Cir. 1970).
41. Although unilateral change rules also promote contract stability and
preserve management's right to direct the enterprise, their main objective Is
the establishment of employment terms through collective negotiation. Except for the management's authority with respect to permissive topics, the parties may not effect unilateral change without first resorting to the bargaining
process unless otherwise provided in a collective bargaining agreement, which
itself is a product of the bargaining process.
The primacy of the bargaining obligation in this context is not surprising
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preference for the bargaining process, the NLRB4 and courts43

refuse to recognize economic factors as a justification for unilateral change. In Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co.," for example,
the employer unilaterally reduced the wage rates specified in
the current collective bargaining agreement in response to a severe economic crisis.4 In rejecting the employer's economic
necessity defense, the NLRB stated that "[n]owhere in the statutory terms is any authority granted to us to excuse the commission of the proscribed action because of a showing either
that such action was compelled by economic need or that it may
have served what may appear to us to be a desirable economic
objective."
Thus, although economic necessity may justify 47a
particular bargaining posture, it cannot, short of bankruptcy,
warrant a repudiation of the bargaining process itself or of the
resulting contractual commitments.
because the "practice and procedure of collective bargaining" is the cornerstone of the NLRA. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see also Findling &
Colby, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations
Board-Another View, 51 COLUh. L REV. 170, 170 (1951) (stating that collective bargaining forms the foundation for the national labor policy). This emphasis on collective bargaining is grounded in the belief that collective
bargaining both provides a mechanism for the bilateral resolution of employment disputes and serves a therapeutic function in avoiding labor strife. See
Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Co., 404 U.S.
157, 187 (1971); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211
(1964); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 US. 477, 488 (1960); Jacobs
Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1217-18 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
Unilateral change undermines the collective bargaining process by altering the
negotiating balance established by the NLRA and, in the eyes of unit employees, denigrating the ability of the union to serve as an effective representative.
See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 744-45 (1962); NLRB v. Crompton-Highland
Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1949).
42. See, eg., Willis Elec., Inc., 269 NLRB No. 192, 116 L.RI.M. (BNA)
1045, 1046 (1984); FWD Corp., 257 N.L.IRB. 1300, 1301 (1981); Morelli Constr.
Co., 240 N.LR.B. 1190, 1190 (1979); Airport Limousine Serv., Inc., 231 NLR.B.
932, 934 (1977).
43. See, eg., Arco Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 698, 700 (10th Cir. 1980).

44. 207 N.LR.B. 1063 (1973), enforced, 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
45. 207 N.L.PB. at 1063.
46. Id. at 1064.
47. As a result of recent Supreme Court and congressional actions, a limited exception to the Oak Cliff-Golman rule has developed in the context of
reorganization proceedings under Chapter 1 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
This bankruptcy exception grew out of the pressures of economic recession experienced by private sector employers and was the subject of considerable debate among the courts and legal commentators. See, e g., Bordewieck &
Countryman, The Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements by Chapter11
Debtors, 57 AM. BANKS L.J. 293 (1983); Levy & Blum, Limitations on Rejec-

tion of Union Contracts Under the Bankruptcy Ac4 83 CobL L.T. 259 (1978);
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THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Most public sector decisions espouse unilateral change
rules similar to those in the private sector.48 Many decisions
Comment, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Rejection and Its Consequences, 36 ARK. L. REV. 469 (1983).
In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984), the Supreme Court
held that a bankruptcy court may authorize the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement in a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding if the agreement
burdens the employer's estate and the equities balance in favor of rejection.
See id at 1196. The Court in Bildisco noted that this balancing test, although
less stringent than that sought by the union, was more restrictive than the
normal "business judgment" standard applied to other executory contracts because of the special nature of collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 1195.
The Court also rejected the applicability of NLRA § 8(d) in the reorganization
context and held that an employer, as a debtor-in-possession following the filing of a bankruptcy petition, does not commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally altering contract terms prior to the bankruptcy court's formal
rejection of the contract. See id. at 1199-1200. The Court thus accommodated
the conflicting policies of the NLRA and the Bankruptcy Code with respect to
unilateral contract modification by giving deference to the heightened employer latitude envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code.
Congress moved quickly to modify the Bildisco decision by striking an accommodation that is more consistent with the policies of the NLRA. The 1984
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code retain a modified balancing test for contract rejection but elevate the role of the bargaining process and prohibit unilateral modification without court approval. See Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 390-91 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113).
The amendments provide that prior to rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement, a debtor-in-possession must make a proposal to the authorized employee representative that outlines those contract modifications necessary to
permit reorganization and must confer in good faith in an attempt to reach
agreement. See id. at 390 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A)). The
bankruptcy court then can reject the labor contract only if the union representative refuses to accept the proposal "without good cause" and the "balance of
equities clearly favors rejection." Id. at 390 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113(c)). Moreover, the amendments prohibit unilateral modification by the
debtor-in-possession in the absence of a bankruptcy court determination that
the interim changes are "essential to the continuation of the debtor's business
or [needed] in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate." Id. at 391 (to
be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e)).
Although Chapter 11 proceedings do provide an exception to the rule of
Oak Cliff-Golman for certain financially strapped employers, the exception
clearly is a limited one. The new legislation accommodates the bargaining and
stability concerns that underlie private sector unilateral change rules by making collective bargaining a key element of the reorganization process and
prohibiting unilateral change in the absence of court approval. Moreover, the
balancing test for contract rejection reflects the special status of collective bargaining agreements and provides a greater scope of protection than that given
other types of executory contracts.
48. See, e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 596601, 295 A.2d 526, 541-43 (1972); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit,
391 Mich. 44, 53, 214 N.W.2d 803, 808 (1974); General Drivers Union Local 346
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also follow Oak Ciff-Golman in holding that economic hardship does not justify the unilateral modification of employment
terms. 49 Unilateral change is nonetheless far more prevalent in
the public sector,50 with the bases for such expanded unilateral
change opportunities corresponding to the perceived differences
between collective bargaining in the public and private sectors.
Indeed, it has become almost obligatory in contemporary scholarly literature to argue that the theoretical distinctions between the two sectors preclude the possibility of transplanting
51
private sector policies and procedures to the public sector.
Nevertheless, the brief history of public sector labor relations is
largely a story of how these theoretical distinctions have bev. Independent School Dist. No. 704, 283 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Minn. 1979); Lincoln
Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Lincoln, 198 Neb. 174, 176, 252 N.W.2d 607, 610
(1977); In re Cumberland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 141, 394 A.2d 946,
950 (1978).
49. See eg., Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida Pub. Employees Relations
Comm'n, 353 So. 2d 108, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Professional Staff Congress/CUNY v. Board of Higher Educ., 83 Misc. 2d 900, 902, 373 N.YS.2d 453,
455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); San Francisco Community College Dist. Fed'n of
Teachers Local 2121 v. San Francisco Community College Dist., No. SF-CE-201
(Cal. PERB Oct. 12,1979), noted in 839 GOV'T EMPL. REt. REP. (BNA) 11 (Dec.
3, 1979); City of Detroit & Amalgamated Transit Union, 1984 M.E.R.C. Lab.
Op. 937, 939, 944 (Mich. ERC Sept. 27, 1984), noted in 22 GOV'T EuPt. Rt.
REP. (BNA) 2227 (Dec. 3, 1984); Oregon Nurses Ass'n v. Polk County, 6
P.E.C.B.R. 5426, 5431-32 (Or. ERB Oct. 27,1982), noted in 21 GOV'T EMPL- RE
REP. (BNA) 176 (Jan. 24, 1983).
50. Although this Article deals primarily with public sector unilateral
change in states with comprehensive, NLRA-type bargaining laws, it should be
noted that the public employer's authority to take unilateral action is substantially broader in the minority of jurisdictions not having comprehensive bargaining legislation. For example, in Virginia, which has no bargaining law, the
Virginia Supreme Court has held that a public employer lacks the authority to
enter into binding collective bargaining agreements, even on a voluntary basis.
See Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington, 217 Va. 558, 581, 232 S.E.2d 30,
44-45 (1977). Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted that state's
bargaining law, which obligates public employers only to "confer" with an exclusive representative, as reserving authority in public employers to modify
any resulting collective agreements on a unilateral basis. See Sumpter v. City
of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359, 363-64 (Mo. 1982).
51- See, e.g., M. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 732 (1971); Corbett, Determining the Scope of Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A New Look Via a Balancing Formula, 40 MONT. L REv. 231, 253-57
(1979); Kilberg, AppropriateSubjects for Bargainingin Local Government Labor Relations, 30 MD. L. REv. 179, 184-91 (1970); Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public-SectorBargaining,10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25, 165 (1974). But
see Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE
L.J. 1156, 1156-57 (1974) (noting that "it does not follow from the proposition
that collective bargaining in the public and private sectors is different ... that
practices in the private sector cannot be transplanted to the public sector").
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come obsolete as labor relations in the public sector increasingly has taken on the attributes of private sector labor
52
relations.
The sovereignty doctrine provided the traditional theoretical constraint on public sector collective bargaining. Emanating
from the old English common law notion that the "king can do
no wrong," the sovereignty doctrine taught that the state, as
the supreme repository of all legal and political authority, could
not be compelled to accept an obligation against its will.5 3 The
doctrine also implied that public employees, as servants of the
sovereign, owed a duty of "extra loyalty" to the state. 54 A related barrier to the development of public sector collective bargaining was the delegation doctrine, which prohibited
government from delegating to private parties authority concerning matters properly within its legislative discretion. 55 Because collective negotiation was viewed as a threat to the
absolute prerogative of the sovereign and the undivided loyalty
52. For an excellent discussion of this trend, see Schneider, Public-Sector
Labor Legislation-An EvolutionaryAnalysis, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING
191-223 (1979). This evolution toward the private sector model is most vividly
illustrated by the fact that the private sector attribute thought to be most incompatible with the public sector, the right to strike, is now legally protected
in limited form by legislation in ten states. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200
(1984); HAwAII REv. STAT. § 89-12 (1976 & Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 1617 (Smith-Hurd 1984); MINN. STAT. § 179A.18 (1984); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-31-201 (1983), as construed in State ez rel. Dep't of Highways v. Public
Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 352, 529 P.2d 785, 788 (1974); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.03 (Page Supp. 1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 243.726 (1983);
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.1001-.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)(6)(c) (West
Supp. 1984-1985). In addition, in a recent decision the California Supreme
Court, after noting the legislative silence on the issue, held that "strikes by
public employees are not unlawful at common law unless or until it is clearly
demonstrated that such a strike creates a substantial and imminent threat to
the health and safety of the public." County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, Local 660, 38 Cal. 3d 564, -, 699 P.2d 835, 850,
214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 439 (1985).
53. For a more detailed description of the sovereignty doctrine and its implications for public sector bargaining, see K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW
OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 14-20 (N.Y. State School of In-

dus. and Labor Relations, Cornell Univ. 1967), reprinted in part in H. EDwARDs, R. CLARK & C. CRAVER, supra note 2, at 23, 25-28; J. WEITZMAN, THE
SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 7-12 (1975); H. WELLINGTON &

R. WINTER, supra note 51, at 35-41; Kilberg, supra note 51, at 181-83.
54. See Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REv. 357, 360-61 (1972); Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or
Second Class Citizen, 16 LAB. L.J. 685, 686-87 (1965).
55. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.12, at 193-98
(1978); J. WEITZMAN, supra note 53, at 10-12.
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of public employees, as well as an improper delegation, or abdication, of governmental authority to labor unions,-4 a number
of courts 57during the 1940's held public sector bargaining to be
unlawful.
As government's role in society expanded, the overarching
concept of absolute governmental supremacy became archaic
and unworkable. 5s Government began to assume more ordi-

5
nary legal responsibilities in its relationship with the public,

9

and the paternalistic "extra loyalty" doctrine declined as its
patent unfairness became increasingly apparent. 60 The dra56. In 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed the prevailing sentiment of the period in a letter to the President of the National Federation of
Federal Employes:
All government employes should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into
the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations
when applied to public personnel management. The very nature and
purposes of Government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions
with Government employe organizations. The employer is the whole
people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives
in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and employes alike
are governed and guided, and in many instances restricted, by laws
which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters.
Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward (Aug. 16, 1937), reprinted in C. RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAw 436-37
(1946).

57. See, eg., Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 650-51,
178 P.2d 537, 545 (1947); Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 185 Md. 261, 270, 44
A.2d 745, 747 (1945); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1251, 206
S.W2d 539, 545 (1947); Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 876, 44
N.Y.S.2d 601, 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 267 A D. 470, 47 N.Y.S.2d 404, qffd, 293 N.Y. 315, 56
N.E.2d 721 (1944), affd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Hagerman v. Dayton, 147 Ohio St.
313, 329, 71 N.E.2d 246, 254 (1947).
58. See J. WEITzmAN, supra note 53, at 8-12; H. WELLINGTON & R. WIN.
TER, supra note 51, at 36-41; Edwards, supra note 54, at 359-6L
59. This trend is best illustrated by the abrogation of absolute sovereign
immunity. See Edwards, supra note 54, at 360.
60. The reasons for the collapse of this concept and that of sovereignty in
general were summarized by then-Professor, now-Judge, Harry T. EdwardsIt would seem the extra-loyalty theory is open to the same criticism as the sovereignty theory:, it too is vague, conclusory, and not adequately founded in the realities of the modern situation. Based upon
an assumed consensus as to the proper role of government in society,
it offers no guidance as to what the employee must give up. Further,
it puts forth no reason for this sacrifice, save the equation government
equals sovereign equals absolute fealty. Such an equation is hardly a
viable alternative in our modern society. Indeed, with so many "urgent" demands on the government's admittedly inadequate resources
...it outrages modern notions of industrial democracy to relegate a
large segment of the work force to dependence upon the conscience of
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matic growth in public sector unionism that followed 6 ' made
comprehensive bargaining legislation a practical necessity
rather than a startling innovation.6 2 Early attempts in the legislative formulations to limit public sector unions to only a conferring role gave way to a bargaining duty similar to that
63
required by the NLRA.
This decline of the sovereignty doctrine and the enactment
of comprehensive bargaining laws did not, however, result in
the wholesale adoption of the private sector model. Instead,
courts and commentators formulated a new set of theoretical
constraints that, although no longer foreclosing public sector
bargaining in its entirety, purportedly required a more limited
scope of bargaining and a ban on the right to strike.
These modern constraints on the bargaining obligation are
a result of both the structural complexity of government and
the demands of the democratic political process." The structural obstacles in the public sector stem from the coexistence of
public employee bargaining legislation with a large body of constitutional and statutory provisions that also bear on the employment relationship and that, for the most part, predate the
advent of public sector bargaining. 65 The political limitations
the government. A degree of self-determinism has become a way of
life for the American worker, and nowhere is it more necessary than
in the public sector.
Edwards, supra note 54, at 361.
61. In 1956, only 915,000 federal, state, and local employees were union
members. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. 1865,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1975, 382 table 155 (1975). By 1980, the
number of state and local employees that belonged to employee organizations
had risen to 5,030,564, or 48.8% of all state and local workers. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVS. ADMIN., No.
102, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN STATE AND

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

1980, 1 table B (1981).
62. See Blair, supra note 1, at 5; Schneider, supra note 52, at 197. By 1977,
33 states had enacted collective bargaining legislation that covered some or all
occupational groups. See ia. at 192.
63. See Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71
MICH. L. REv. 885, 895-99 (1973).
64. See Edwards, supra note 54, at 361-64; Kay, The Need for Limitation
Upon the Scope of Negotiations in Public Education II, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 155, 155
(1973).
Another purported obstacle to the adoption of the private sector model is
the concept that government services are "essential" to the public safety,
health, and welfare. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 51, at 21-24.
Since this notion is primarily of importance to the issue of whether public employees should possess the right to strike, it is not discussed extensively in this
Article.
65. See Weber, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that "public sector unionism and
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result from the fear that adopting private sector notions regarding the scope of bargaining and contract enforcement might
skew the democratic process by giving public sector unions an
inordinate degree of power in comparison with other interest
groups.6 6 Although these two sets of theoretical constraints are
more refined than the sovereignty and "extra loyalty" doctrines
they replaced, the history of public sector bargaining during the
fiscal crisis indicates that even these newer limitations are frequently overstated and in need of careful reevalution.
II. STRUCTURAL GROUNDS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR
UNILATERAL CHANGE
To a far greater extent than in the private sector, collective
bargaining in the public sector requires an accommodation between bargaining legislation and a host of other statutes that
frequently are not compatible with private sector notions of
bargaining. Examples of such conflicting rules include constitutional and statutory provisions that provide for a diffused management structure in which multiple officers or agencies share
decision-making authority concerning public employee terms
and conditions of employment, causing confusion over which
entity is the "public employer." 6 7 Another difficulty is
presented by statutory or regulatory provisions that, instead of
delegating to various officials authority to make personnel-related decisions, directly set specific terms and conditions of employment or establish personnel procedures. The problem
when confronted with such provisions lies in determining
whether they preempt the bargaining obligation. 68 Because the
structural problems in both instances are largely statutory in
form, however, state legislatures have the authority to structure the personnel function in a manner that does not unduly
restrict collective bargaining.
A.

DIFFUSED MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

Although private sector employers tend to be readily idenbargaining were superimposed on a well developed, explicit and, indeed, almost ossified alternate personnel system which went under the folkloric term,

civil service").
66. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 72-168 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 169-87 and accompanying text.
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tifiable and possess a clearly delineated managerial structure, 69
statutes in the public sector frequently vest multiple agencies
or officials with shared responsibility over employment matters. Identifying the appropriate "public employer" in this context is no easy task. 70 Although diffused management
authority occurs in many public sector contexts, 71 perhaps the
most troublesome situation is that of a school board or an executive branch agency that has broad statutory authority over
terms and conditions of employment but is dependent on another body for funding. Unilateral change possibilities abound
when the funding authority either fails to fund a contract negotiated by the first-line "employer" or subsequently reduces an
anticipated appropriation.
1.

Local Government Level

The Pennsylvania case of Philadelphia Federation of
Teachers, Local No. 3 v. Thomas 72 illustrates the problem of
unilateral change resulting from diffused management authority at the local government level. In Thomas, the Philadelphia
Board of Education and the teachers' union had negotiated a
two-year collective bargaining agreement that provided for
wage increases in the second year of the contract. 73 Under the
governing constitutional and statutory scheme, the board of education possessed no independent taxing authority and was dependent on the Philadelphia City Council for funding.7 4 Due to
fiscal difficulties, the city council reduced its appropriation to
the board for the second year of the contract. The board thus
was unable to finance the wage increases and unilaterally re69. See Derber, Management Organizationfor Collective Bargaining in
the Public-Sector,in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 80, 81 (1979).

70. Judge Harry Edwards has observed that other public sector questions

"pale by comparison to the problem of attempting to identify the real public
'employer' in any given public sector negotiations." Edwards, supra note 63, at

903. For other discussions of the problem of diffused management authority,
see Blair, supra note 1, at 8-10; Miscimarra, Inability to Pay: The Problem of
Contract Enforcement in Public Sector Collective Bargaining,43 U. PiTT. L.
REV. 703, 705-08, 725-29 (1982).
71. For example, a county sheriff or juvenile court judge may possess hiring and firing responsibilities while the county board of commissioners has authority over financial terms of employment. See, e.g., General Drivers, Local
346 v. Aitkin County Bd., 320 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Minn. 1982) (county sheriff);
Circuit Court v. AFSCME Local 502-A, 295 Or. 542, -, 669 P.2d 314, 316 (1983)
(juvenile court judge).
72. 62 Pa. Commw. 286, 436 A.2d 1228 (1981).
73. See id at 288-89, 436 A.2d at 1229-30.
74. Id at 290, 436 A.2d at 1230.
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scinded that portion of the agreement.7 5 The Pennsylvania

Commonwealth Court sustained the board's action, holding
that no binding contract existed for the second year of the contract term.7 6 The court explained that the dependent funding
scheme made the contract severable in nature, with each year
of the contract subject to an implied condition precedent that
adequate funding be forthcoming.7 Since this condition was
not fulfilled, the second year of the contract never came into
existence, and the board was not obligated to abide by the

agreement

s

The approach of the court in Thomas, although not
unique,7 9 is subject to criticism on both legal and policy
grounds. A multiple-year collective bargaining agreement, such
as the one between the board of education and teachers' union
in Thomas, is not merely a series of separate contracts but instead an integrated document in which reduced benefits for one
period typically are traded for increased benefits in another.80
The condition precedent approach of Thomas, however, permits
the unilateral modification of this integrated document without
any showing of fiscal necessity and leaves open the possibility
of collusion between the two management entities. 8 ' The judi75. Id. at 289, 436 A.2d at 1230.
76. See id. at 296, 436 A.2d at 1233.
77. See id
78. Id. at 296-97, 436 A.2d at 1233.
79. The Maryland Court of Appeals also upheld a school board's unilateral elimination of a midterm wage adjustment under circumstances nearly
identical to those in Thomas. See Montgomery County Council of Supporting
Servs. Employees, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 354 A.2d 781, 788 (Md. 1976). The
Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, although rejecting the conditional term theory, recently held that a school board did not commit an unfair
labor practice when, acting as a legislative body, it refused to appropriate
funds for a pay raise that the same board previously had agreed to while acting
in its alter ego as an employing entity. See Holmes County Teacher's Ass'n v.
14,207, at 400-01 (Fla. PERC May 24, 1983), noted in 3
School Bd., 9 F.P.E..
PuB. EMPL BARGAINuNG REP. (CCH) 43,797. For other decisions that have
discussed the Thomas line of reasoning favorably, see South Bend Community
School Corp. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n--South Bend, 444 N.E.2d 348, 351-52 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983); Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 370
Mass. 455, 470, 350 N.E.2d 707, 718 (1976). The Maryland and Washington
teacher bargaining laws also appear to permit such midterm modifications.
See 1MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 6-511 (1978) (expressly sanctioning midterm modifications); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 41.59.935, 28A.58.095 (Supp. 1985) (voiding
all school employee pay increases to the extent they exceed annual
appropriations).
80. See Sonoma County Org. of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23
Cal. 3d 296, 312-13, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 912, 591 P.2d 1, 10 (1979).
81. See Miscimarra, supra note 70, at 705-08, 725-29.
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cial interjection of an implied condition precedent also ignores
the fact that the parties themselves failed to provide for an express condition precedent even though a reduced appropriation
8 2
should have been a foreseeable event.
More important than the reasoning in Thomas, which subsequently has been questioned by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court,8 3 is the evident lack of legislative guidance in resolving
issues of diffused management. In the absence of clearly defined roles and procedures, the complexities of diffused management authority are left to ad hoc judicial resolution. 84 This
approach necessarily results in unpredictability and the very
real possibility of unmet employee expectations, which, as the
teachers' strike in Thomas illustrates,a5 provide a natural catalyst for labor unrest. Although public policy and management
efficiency justify the centralization of fiscal control in elective
legislative bodies, 86 these considerations do not justify the absence of an articulated process that could promote predictability and binding agreements while still retaining legislative body
review.
82. By implying a funding condition precedent in Thomas, the commonwealth court appears to have equated financial hardship with impossibility of
performance. Williston explains that financial hardship or insolvency is a
"perfect illustration" of foreseeable, subjective impossibility, which, unlike objective impossibility, does not ordinarily excuse contract performance. See 18
S. WILISTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1932, at 10 (3d ed. 1978).
83. A recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, although not
expressly mentioning the Thomas case, clearly disagreed with the commonwealth court's rationale. See International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, Local
1201 v. Board of Educ., 500 Pa. 474, 457 A.2d 1269 (1983). The Local 1201 case
arose out of the same funding reduction as did Thomas. Relying on the rationale of the earlier Thomas decision, the commonwealth court in Local 1201 vacated an arbitration award that ordered the board of education to pay secondyear contract adjustments to certain nonteaching employees. See Board of
Educ. v. International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 71 Pa. Commw. 497, 500, 455
A.2d 738, 741, rev'd, 500 Pa. 474, 457 A.2d 1269 (1983). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reinstated the award, holding that the board could be excused
from performance of the contract only if the funding condition precedent was
expressly stated in the contract or the board established that performance was
impossible under any circumstances. See Local 1201, 500 Pa. at 479, 457 A.2d at
1271.
84. For decisions illustrating the inherent difficulties of ad hoc judicial
resolution of the diffused management problem, see Fort Wayne Patrolman's
Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Fort Wayne, 408 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980); Rochester Educ. Ass'n v. City of Rochester, 116 N.H. 402, 403, 359 A.2d
640, 641 (1976); Koenig v. Morin, 90 Misc. 2d 185, 188, 393 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd sub nom. Healy v. Morin, 59 A.D.2d 644, 398 N.Y.S.2d 342
(1977); Ortblad v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 109, 110, 530 P.2d 635, 636 (1975).
85. See Thomas, 62 Pa. Commw. at 288-92, 436 A.2d at 1230-31.
86. See Summers, supra note 51, at 1183-85.
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Diffused management authority is primarily a problem of
conflicting statutory provisions. State legislatures possess the
authority to impose a statutory solution by reorganizing employee relations in a coherent, predictable manner. Unfortunately, many bargaining statutes fail to provide any guidance to
minimize the problem of diffused management authority.87

Although most states with comprehensive bargaining laws re8
quire legislative body approval of bargaining agreements, 8
many fail to detail procedures in the event of rejection. 89 Some
states do mandate renegotiation in the event of legislative body
disapproval but do not set time guidelines for legislative action
or do not address the possibility of midterm funding shortages
for multiple-year contracts. ° Other states attempt to coordinate the negotiation and budget-setting processes by specifying
time or notice requirements for bargaining. 91 Although this
measure alone is insufficient to resolve the diffused management problem, three more fundamental legislative approaches

are available.
One solution to the diffused management problem is to define the immediate employer and the funding entity as joint
employers. Both parties participate in negotiations and are
87.
LAWS

See, e-g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-1312 (1979); MICH. COMP.
(West 1978 & Supp. 1983); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§§ 423.201-.216

§§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon 1984).
88. See, eg., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4330(c) (1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
150E, § 7(b) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976). Although most statutes require legislative approval only for items that necessitate funding, see, eg., NHL REV.
STAT. ANN. § 273-A:3b (1978), a few mandate legislative review of the entire
contract, see, ag., MINN. STAT. § 179A.22(4) (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN.

§§ 3-18-7 to -8 (1980).
89. See, ag., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 204a (McKinney 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. §§ 3-18-7 to -8 (1980).
90. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.215 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 8910(b) (1982); N.11 REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A 3(I)(b) (1978). The Iowa bargaining law requires that negotiated agreements provide for either an automatic
reduction in benefits or renegotiation in case of insufficient funding. See IOWA
CODE ANN. § 20.17 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983). Some state statutes expressly
preclude renegotiation and provide that the legislative determination of the
amount of funds available for employee salaries is binding. See, ag., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 447.309(2) (West 1981).
91. Such provisions may require that negotiations begin a certain number
of days before the budget submission date, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-153d(b) (Supp. 1983) (180 days for teachers); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 965(1) (1974 & Supp. 1983) (120 days for municipal employees), that they begin sometime before the budget deadline, see ag., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.7
(West 1980) (public school employees); HAwAII REv. STAT. 89-9a (1976), or that
they conclude prior to budget adoption, see, eg., IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.17(10)
(West 1978).
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bound with respect to agreements relating to their respective
spheres of authority. A drawback of this approach is that the
joint employers may have divergent views on bargaining proposals that can seriously undermine a unified management
presence at the bargaining table. 92 This is particularly true
with respect to financial items, on which the authority of the
joint employers may overlap. Moreover, since legislative bodies
seldom possess the time or expertise to participate directly in
labor negotiations, 93 agreements typically are negotiated by representatives and thus still require independent legislative review. Although a handful of opinions have endorsed this joint
employer approach, 94 its inefficiency has resulted in a decline
95
in popularity.
The less complex and perhaps more effective of the two remaining approaches is to define the public employer as the entity having final authority over fiscal matters. The Minnesota
bargaining law, for example, defines the public employer of
municipal employees as the entity possessing "final budgetary
approval authority." 96 This body must consult with other agencies or officials having responsibility over employment terms
but has full authority to enter into agreements that are binding
92. See Labor Relations Comm'n v. Natick, 369 Mass. 431, 439, 339 N.E.2d
900, 905 (1976) ("The selectmen and a chief may disagree on which of them
should make concessions in order to come to an agreement. . . . Moreover,
chiefs as negotiators might have a conflict of interest because their own salaries may be affected by the salaries negotiated.").
93. See Henkel & Wood, Collective Bargainingby State Workers: Legislatures Have the Final Voice in the Appropriation of Funds, 11 J. COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS 215, 221-22 (1982).

94. See, e.g., AFSCME v. County of Lancaster, 196 Neb. 89, 96, 241 N.W.2d
523, 526 (1976); County of Ulster v. CSEA Unit of Ulster County Sheriff's
Dep't, 37 A.D.2d 437, 439, 326 N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 (1971); Costigan v. Local 696,
Philadelphia Fin. Dep't Employees, 462 Pa. 425, 434-35, 341 A.2d 456, 461
(1975). The Hawaii bargaining law adopts a unique version of the joint employer approach by assigning a proportionate number of votes to multiple employing entities. See HAWAI REV. STAT. § 89-6(b) (1976). For example, the
"employer" of workers in the statewide firefighters' unit is defined as the governor, who is entitled to four votes, together with the mayors of each of Hawaii's four counties, each of whom is entitled to one vote. Id.
95. See, e.g., Labor Relations Comm'n v. Town of Natick, 369 Mass. 431,
439, 339 N.E.2d 900, 905 (1976); General Drivers, Local 346 v. Aitkin County
Bd., 320 N.W.2d 695, 700-01 (Minn. 1982). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has noted that rejection of the joint employer approach "avoids the potential
difficulties of having too many decision-makers, none with full authority to
reach an agreement, on the public side of the bargaining table." Ellenbogen v.
County of Allegheny, 479 Pa. 429, 436, 388 A.2d 730, 734 (1978).
96. MINN. STAT. § 179A.03(15)(c) (1984).
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on management as a whole for the duration of the contract.97
This single-tier approach is simple and predictable. It also focuses the labor relations function in the most publicly accessible forum. This solution, however, may be politically
unacceptable in some jurisdictions because it necessarily results
in a reallocation of governmental authority.9 8
The final approach is to transform the two-tiered approach
that exists in most states into a more coherent process that
mandates immediate review by the funding authority and binds
both management entities upon legislative body approval.9
The Connecticut Municipal Employee Relations Act, for example, defines "municipal employer" broadly as "any political subdivision,"' 0 0 which necessarily includes those subdivisions
without independent funding authority. Agreements negotiated by the employer that require funding from another source
must be submitted to the appropriate legislative body within
fourteen days.10 ' The legislative body then has thirty days to
accept or reject the funding request. If rejected, the contract is
returned to the parties for renegotiation. If approved, or if no
action is taken within the thirty-day period, the legislative body
is obligated to appropriate all funds required to comply with
the agreement, notwithstanding any statutory limitation that
102
may otherwise exist.
A helpful supplement to this two-tiered approach would be
a provision in the bargaining statute that both binds the legislative body for the term of the contract and limits the contract
duration to a reasonable length. 0 3 Ideally, the contract term
and the budget cycle should coincide.1° 4 The absence of such a
provision leaves open the possibility of midterm modifications
when the initial funding approval does not cover the entire con97. Id.;see General Drivers, Local 346 v. Aitldn County Board, 320 N.W.2d
695, 700 (Minn. 1982).
98. See Miscimarra, supra note 70, at 727-28.
99. See, eg., CONN. GEN.STAT. ANN. § 7-474(b), (c) (West 1972 & Supp.
1983) (municipal employees); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 150E, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-

op. 1984); Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(B) (Page Supp. 1984).
100. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-467(1) (West Supp. 1983).
101. Id § 7-474(b) (West 1972).
102. Id

103. A maximum contract term of two or three years would be preferable.
A longer duration may impair the public employer's ability to respond to
changing financial circumstances, whereas a shorter term would restrict bargaining flexibility and necessitate almost continuous negotiations.

104. Some bargaining laws expressly coordinate the term of public employee contracts with the budgetary period. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-837
(1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11L92(3) (West 1974).
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tract term. In Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Committee of Boston,1 05 for example, the Boston School Committee
contended that the second- and third-year salary provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement were unenforceable because
the city council had appropriated sufficient funds for only the
first year of the contract.1 06 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected this argument, holding that the city council's appropriation for the first year of the contract served as an
approval of the entire contract and bound the council to appro10 7
priate the necessary funds for the entire contract term.
Although the Massachusetts court reached a desirable result,
advance clarification by statute would have been preferable.
The problem of diffused management authority thus can be
ameliorated by a carefully drafted statutory response. There is
little justification for sanctioning an unpredictable midterm
modification by a body that already has had the opportunity to
review a collective bargaining agreement. The Minnesota 08
and Connecticut'0 9 statutes illustrate how this unnecessary basis for public sector unilateral change can be eliminated while
still preserving the safeguard of legislative review.
2. State Government Level
Structural problems are more complex on the state level
than on the local level. Although the structure of local governmental units is under the control of the state legislature, which
is free to organize personnel administration by statute, 1" 0 state
governmental structure is determined to a considerable degree
by state constitutional provisions.'
Two aspects of this constitutionally mandated structure of state government-the legislature's authority over monetary appropriations and its function
as the supreme law-making body of state government-have
important implications for the unilateral alteration of collective
bargaining agreements.
105. 386 Mass. 197, 434 N.E.2d 1258 (1982). The case arose even though the
Massachusetts bargaining law contains a legislative approval provision similar
to that of Connecticut. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 7 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1984).
106. 386 Mass. at 203, 434 N.E.2d at 1263.
107. See id at 204, 434 N.E.2d at 1263.
108. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
110. 2 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 4.03a-4.04 (3d ed. 1979).
111. Bosworth, Policy Making, in THE 50 STATES AND THEIR LOCAL GovERNmENTS 297, 301 (J. Fesler ed. 1967).
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The AppropriationsFunction

Virtually every state constitution contains a provision that
vests exclusive authority over appropriations in the state legislature.1 2 State bargaining laws, however, usually define the
"employer" of public employees in a manner that excludes the
legislature.113 This diffusion of authority at the state level creates the potential for unilateral change if the legislature fails to
appropriate all of the funds necessary to implement a contract
negotiated by the executive branch. As of 1982, twenty of the
thirty states with bargaining laws applicable to state employees
contained language subjecting the monetary terms of bargaining agreements to the appropriations process of the legislature.- 4 In those states with bargaining laws that are silent or
unclear on this issue, courts consistently have refused to enforce the financial provisions of state employee agreements in
the absence of an express legislative appropriation 5 Statutory
guidance thus is needed to maximize predictability and fairness.
The constitutional dimension of the diffused authority
problem at the state level, however, restricts the available statutory alternatives. The single-tiered approach adopted in Minnesota for municipal employees"16 is not feasible at the state
level since a number of state court decisions have held that the
legislature may not delegate its constitutional authority over
appropriations to the executive branch.'1 7 Even if the delegation problems could be avoided, a statutory enactment cannot
bind a future legislature to a waiver of constitutional authority.n 8 Similarly, direct legislative control of the negotiation
112. See ag., MINN. CoNsr. artXI, § 1; W. VA. CONSr. art. X, § 3.
113. See Blair, supra note 1, at 11.
114. Henkel & Wood, supra note 93, at 217, 218-20 table 1.

115. See eg., California State Employees Ass'n v. Flournoy, 32 Cal. App. 3d
219, 236, 108 Cal. Rptr. 251, 264, cert denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); State v.

AFSCME, Local 1726, 298 Al2d 362, 372 (Del. Ch. 1972); United Faculty of
Florida, Local 1880 v. Board of Regents, 365 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 91 N.J. 464, 471-72, 453

A.2d 176, 180 (1982). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that impasse arbitration awards, see infra note 281, as well as voluntary agreements, are unenforceable absent a specific legislative appropriation. See Minnesota Educ.
Ass'n v. State, 282 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S.
1062 (1980).
116. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.

117. See, e.g., California State Employees Ass'n v. Flournoy, 32 Cal. App. 3d
219, 234, 108 Cal. Rptr. 251, 262-63, cerL denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); State v.
AFSCME, Local 1726, 298 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. Ch. 1972).
118.

1A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.02, at 107

(4th ed. 1972); see also Minnesota Educ. Ass'n v. State, 282 N.W.2d 915, 919
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process is administratively untenable. 119 The only realistic solution is a two-tiered approach similar to that of the Connecticut Municipal Employee Relations Act, 120 which expressly
alerts the parties to the necessity of prompt legislative review.
A model act applicable to state employees that follows the Connecticut approach should limit the duration of the contract to
the state appropriations cycle. 121 Although at the local level,
legislation or judicial construction can commit the legislative
body to future funding upon initial contract approval, 122 at the
state level nothing short of an appropriation for the entire contract term will remove the possibility of subsequent legislative
repudiation.
The likelihood of contract rejection and its accompanying
dislocation can be reduced further by providing channels of
communication between the legislative and executive branches.
The bargaining laws of California and Minnesota include innovative provisions for legislative involvement. The California
Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act, which de1 23
fines "employer" as the governing board of each institution,
authorizes the governor, the speaker of the assembly, and the
senate rules committee to have a representative present during
negotiations and directs the negotiating employers to maintain
a close liaison with the legislature on financial matters. 1 24 Nevertheless, the confusion resulting from the presence at the bargaining table of multiple management representatives and the
fact that there are different employers for each institution dirninishes the likelihood of establishing a unified management
stance. A better approach is Minnesota's pure consultation
model. Under the Minnesota bargaining law, a twelve-person
legislative committee acts as a consultative body 25 to the Corn(Minn. 1979) ("As the source of sovereign governmental power, the Legislature is able to bind all other groups except a subsequent legislature . .. .);
City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 148-49, 411 A.2d 462, 469-70 (1980) (legislature can disregard prior fiscal enactments by not appropriating money to
fund them).
119. See Henkel & Wood, supra note 93, at 221-22.
120. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. The Connecticut State
Employees Relations Act contains a legislative review process similar to that
provided for municipal employees. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5278(b) (West Supp. 1983) (state employees) with id § 7-474(b) (West 1972)
(municipal employees).
121. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.92(3) (West 1974).
122. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
123. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562 (West Supp. 1983).
124. See id § 3572.
125. See MINN. STAT. § 3.855 (1984).
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missioner of Employee Relations, the sole designated "employer" of all state employees.& 2 Contracts negotiated by the
commissioner are first reviewed by the legislative committee
and, if approved, submitted to the legislature as a whole.'
b.

The Law-Making Function

Although the legislature's appropriations authority in state
government is one basis for unilateral change, a more farreaching one is the legislature's general law-making function.
As the supreme law-making body of state government, the legislature, subject only to constitutional restraints, retains the authority to amend its own collective bargaining legislation and to

enact superseding statutes governing employment matters.
Such actions were not uncommon during the recent period of

fiscal retrenchment.
The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in AFSC1ME,
Council 6 v. Sundquist mnillustrates that the unilateral modification of public sector bargaining agreements by substantive
law-making raises serious constitutional, as opposed to statutory, issues. In Sundquist the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a statute passed by the Minnesota legislature adopting,
inter alia,' 2 9 a new leave-of-absence policy for state employees. 130 Although the court acknowledged that the adoption of
this policy resulted in the unilateral alteration of employment
terms established in existing collective bargaining agreements, 13 ' it held that the new statutory provision could not be
challenged as an unfair labor practice because the Minnesota
Public Employment Labor Relations Act, like most other state
bargaining laws,132 did not include the legislature within its def126. See id. § 179A.22(2).
127. See id. §§ 3.855(2), 179A.22(4).
128. 338 N.W.2d 560 (Minn 1983).
129. Actually, the principal legislative action challenged in Sundquist was

a requirement that various state and local employees contribute an additional
two percent of their salaries to their pension funds during 1983. See id. at 565.
The court upheld this provision on the grounds that the legislature's modification of contribution rates did not abridge any contract rights, see id. at 567-69,
and that pension matters are illegal topics of bargaining under Minnesota's
bargaining law, see id at 575-76.
130. Specifically, the Act provided that through the first half of 1983, state
employees taking unpaid leaves of absence could continue to accrue most of
their fringe benefits as if they had been working during the period of their
leaves. See id. at 565.
131. See id. at 577.
132. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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The court explained that the

"[p]ublic employees' sole avenue of relief for a unilateral legislative change in the terms and conditions of employment under
an existing collective bargaining agreement is to proceed under
state and federal constitutional provisions.' 34 Thus, unilateral
action that would be an unfair labor practice if undertaken by
any other public or private employer is lawful if done by the
state legislature as long as the action is not unconstitutional.
The contract clause' 35 is the principal constitutional limitation on the legislature's authority to modify existing collective
bargaining agreements. Although the contract clause literally
proscribes any impairment of contract, the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized that a state, in the exercise
of its police powers, may protect the public interest in an emergency by the enactment of reasonably tailored legislation.13
After many years of deferring to state legislative impairments, 137 however, the Court in 1977 revitalized the contract
clause in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey.138 In that case,

the Court invalidated a New Jersey statute that retroactively
repealed a covenant between the state and certain bondholders
139
that limited the use of revenues pledged as security.
In striking down the New Jersey statute in United States
Trust, the Supreme Court adopted an exacting standard for
scrutinizing laws that impair public 40 contracts, stating that
133. See 338 N.W.2d at 577. Minnesota's bargaining law provides that the
Commissioner of Employee Relations is the "employer" of all state employees.
See MINN. STAT. § 179A.22(2) (1984).
134. 338 N.W.2d at 577.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall ... pass any ...
law inpairing the Obligation of Contracts .... ").
136. See, e.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1965); Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434-35 (1934).
137. Prior to 1977, the Court had not invalidated a state statute on contract
clause grounds since Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941). See E. CORWIN, THE
CONsTrruTION AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 140-42 (14th ed. 1978). The Court
explained its deference to state enactments: "Once we are in the domain of
the reserve power of a State we must respect the 'wide discretion on the part
of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary.'" East
New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945) (quoting Manigault
v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905)).
138. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
139. See id. at 9-14.
140. A year later, the Court also increased, to a somewhat lesser degree, its
scrutiny of private contracts. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234, 242-50 (1978) (Minnesota statute imposing a "pension funding charge"
on certain employers terminating their plan or leaving the state unconstitutionally changes employers' contract obligations). More recent decisions, how-
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"complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake."'14 The impairment of public contracts is
constitutional, the Court stated, only if "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."'14 The Court noted
that an impairment is "reasonable" only if the parties did not
foresee at the time of contracting the possibility of changed circumstances1 43 and is "necessary" only if there are no less dras44
tic alternatives available for safeguarding the public interest.1
Despite the strictness of this standard, however, its application
by state courts in the context of public sector bargaining has
been inconsistent and imprecise, as illustrated by two recent decisions by the high courts in New York and California.
In Subway-Surface Supervisors Association v. New York
City TransitAuthority,145 the New York Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the 1975 Financial Emergency Act for the
City of New York, an act that suspended all employee wage increases for a one-year period.146 The statute impaired the collective bargaining agreement covering a unit of city transit
workers .by eliminating a five percent wage increase for the second year of a two-year contract. 147 Although it invoked the
United States Trust standard, the court did not examine independently the foreseeability of the fiscal crisis or the availability of alternatives less drastic than the elimination of
contractual wage increases. 148 Moreover, the court noted that
ever, reflect the older policy of substantial deference to legislative action. See,
ag., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 187-94 (1983) (Alabama statute increasing severance tax on oil and gas not in violation of contract clause); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400, 409-19 (1983)
(Kansas statute limiting ceiling prices on natural gas sold intrastate consistent
with contract clause).
141. 431 U.S. at 26. The Court continued:
If a state could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to
spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose,
the contract clause would provide no protection at all.
[A] state is not completely free to consider impairing the
obligations of its own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives.
Id. at 26, 30-3L
142. Id- at 25.
143. See id at 31-32.
144. See id at 29-31.
145. 44 N.Y.2d 101, 375 N.E.2d 384, 404 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1978).
146. See id- at 107, 375 N.E.2d at 387, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
147.

Id.

148. See id at 109-13, 375 N.E.2d at 388-91, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 328-30. Instead,
the court simply affirmed the legislature's finding that a fiscal emergency ex-
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the impact of the act was merely prospective in nature; the suspended future increases were considered unearned and not
vested since the employees had the right to quit in response to
the legislative modification.1 49 Finally, the court held that the
preferential treatment it previously had given the contract
rights of municipal bondholders 50 did not create an equal protection problem because the bondholders' rights had vested and
the impairment of their rights would have had a significantly
greater impact than would impairing employee rights in terms
of worsening the city's credit rating. 5 1
The California Supreme Court took an approach more respectful of the contract rights of public employees in Sonoma
County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma.1 5 2 In response to Proposition 13,153 which eliminated approximately seven billion dollars in property tax revenues that
would have been available to municipal governments, the California legislature enacted a bill that distributed five billion dollars in surplus state funds to local entities on the condition that
no wage increases be implemented for the 1978-1979 fiscal
year.15 Like the act in Subway-Surface Supervisors, this action modified several collective bargaining agreements providing for second-year wage adjustments. The Sonoma court, in
holding that the action of the California legislature unconstitutionally impaired the employees' right to contract, distinguished Subway-Surface Supervisors on several grounds. It
noted that New York City's fiscal crisis was more severe than
California's 55 and that the impairment in the New York case
isted, stating, "Here, little deference is required, when the circumstances
themselves so clearly demonstrate that the Legislature's conclusion was a
valid one." Id. at 112, 375 N.E.2d at 390, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 329. Although this
undoubtedly was factually accurate, the existence of a budgetary emergency
does not itself justify impairment under the United States Trust test.
149. See id. at 112-13, 375 N.E.2d at 390-91, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
150. See Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731,
358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
151. See Subway-Surface Supervisors, 44 N.Y.2d at 113-14, 375 N.E.2d at
391, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 330-31.
152. 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979).
153. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. For a description of Proposition 13, see Swimmer, The Impact of Proposition13 on Public Employee Relations: The Case of
Los Angeles, 11 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 13 (1982).
154. See 23 Cal. 3d at 302, 309-10, 591 P.2d at 3, 8, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 905, 91011.
155. Although everyone acknowledged the severity of the fiscal crisis in
New York City, the crisis created in California by Proposition 13 was largely
ameliorated by the legislature's subsequent distribution of surplus funds. See
23 Cal. 3d at 310-12, 591 P.2d at 8-9, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11. Because the gov-
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was less burdensome because it merely deferred, rather than
eliminated, the wage increases. 156 In addition to drawing these
factual distinctions, the California court rejected the supposition in Subway-Surface Supervisors that the elimination of future wage increases provided for in a contract abridged only
prospective, nonvested rights.'5 7 The court instead found that a
multiple-year contract constitutes an indivisible whole for
which employees render consideration from the time of its
commencement.1's
The concept of vesting relied on by the New York court in
Subway-Surface Supervisors and rejected by the California
court in Sonoma is typical of that used by courts permitting legislative bodies to adjust employee compensation established by
statute as long as it is not done retroactively to alter benefits
already earned through performance. 5 9 The introduction of
collective bargaining in the public sector, however, changes
both the nature and timing of the employee's property interest.
Although employee compensation in the absence of collective
bargaining is conferred voluntarily by statute and a property
right arises only on an employee's acceptance of this offer by
performance, 160 employee compensation under a collective bargaining agreement is established by contract. The New York
court thus failed to recognize that the contract itself, once validly executed and ratified, gives rise to a vested obligation for
ernment failed in Sonoma to establish the existence of a true emergency, the
court did not rule on the union's contention that any emergency resulting
from the adoption of Proposition 13 was created by the state's voluntary conduct in limiting its taxing authority and, therefore, could not justify an impairment of contract. The court did indicate, however, that it found this argument
"appealing." See i& at 313, 591 P.2d at 10, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
156. See id- at 312, 591 P.2d at 9, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 911-12.
157. See id at 312-13, 591 P.2d at 9-10, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
158. See i.- The court explained.
[W]e seriously question the New York court's rationale., A contract
must be viewed as a whole; it cannot be fractured into isolated components. The anticipated wage increases during the second year thereof
may have affected the employees' wage demands for the first year of
the contract, and undoubtedly many employees rendered their services in the first year in anticipation of their contractual right to the
second year increase. It is doubtful, therefore, that the New York
court was correct in its conclusion that the employees had not rendered consideration for the second year of the contract when the
freeze was imposed.
Id- at 312-13, 591 P.2d at 10, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
159. See, eg., Grant v. Nellius, 377 A-2d 354, 357-58 (DeL 1977); Personnel
Div. v. St. Clair, 10 Or. App. 106, 109-11, 498 P.2d 809, 811-12 (1972).
160. See Personnel Div. v. St. Clair, 10 Or. App. 106, 109, 498 P.2d 809, 811
(1972).
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the duration of the contract term.161
More disturbing, however, is the New York court's view
that public sector bargaining agreements are less deserving of
protection than are other contractual obligations. 1 2 The
court's comparison of the respective rights of public employees
and municipal bondholders is reminiscent of the paternalistic
notion that public employees owe a duty of "extra loyalty" to
the state. 16 3 This perception stands in marked contrast to the
new Bankruptcy Code amendments, which give private sector
collective bargaining agreements a greater degree of protection
against impairment than they do other types of contractual obligations.'6 In spite of its deficiencies, however, Subway Surface Supervisors is more representative of the current case law
65
than is Sonoma.
The reconciliation of the legislature's law-making function
and the contract clause limitation requires a delicate balancing.
The legislature is not merely an employing entity like a private
company or even a public school board. It is charged with the
constitutional responsibility of protecting the public interest
through the enactment of legislation and must retain the capability of responding to fiscal emergencies. In this sense, legisla161. See Labor Relations Comm'n v. Dracut, 374 Mass. 619, 628, 373 N.E.2d
1165, 1171 (1978).

162. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 47.
165. The Washington Supreme Court recently relied simply on the legislature's assessment of a financial emergency to dismiss a contract clause challenge to a statute that modified a contract provision governing layoff
procedures for community college employees. See Washington Educ. Ass'n v.
State, 97 Wash. 2d 899, 907-08, 652 P.2d 1347, 1351-52 (1982). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in upholding a state statute that altered impasse arbitration procedures contained in a collective bargaining agreement, went a
step further by holding that the "stricter 'review' approach" of United States
Trust is applicable only to the impairment of the substantive financial provisions of a public contract, not to mere procedural modifications. See Local Div.
589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 642 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982). Other public sector decisions resemble
Subway-Surface Supervisors in that they give public bargaining contracts a
subordinate status in interpreting the reach of the contract clause. See, e.g.,
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 210, 359
N.E.2d 1338, 1342, 391 N.Y.S.2d 344, 547-48 (1976) (Jasen, J., dissenting) ("The
intimate relationship between government and its employees permits [legislative] flexibility of a kind that is absent from agreements between private parties . . . [or] between government and its creditors."); see also South Bend
Community School Corp. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-South Bend, - Ind. App. -,
-, 444 N.E.2d 348, 353 (1983) (noting that public bodies may have a narrower
scope of bargaining authority than do private businesses).
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tive action serves a purpose similar to the limited escape valve
66
afforded private sector employers by the bankruptcy laws.'
But just as the bankruptcy exception to the Oak C0iff-Golman
rule that economic necessity does not justify unilateral change
is a limited one, 167 the legislature's authority to modify contracts also requires appropriate restrictions. The United States
Trust standard as applied in Sonoma represents a proper balancing of these considerations by recognizing the appropriateness of legislative intervention in an emergency as well as the
need to give public sector collective bargaining agreements a
status at168 least equal to that afforded any other public
contract.
166. See supra note 47. Municipal employers also may resort to financial
reorganization in bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1982), which contains standards and procedures
that closely parallel those provided under Chapter 11 for private employers.
See Note, Executory Labor Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J.
957, 958 n.7 (1976) (applying Chapter 11 standards to interpret Chapter 9). It
remains to be seen whether Chapter 9 will evolve beyond a theoretical escape
valve to become a common basis for public sector unilateral change. At this
point, public employers appear reluctant to submit the conduct of government
affairs to federal bankruptcy court supervision. See Supreme Court Ruling on
Bankrupt Employer's Contract May Apply to Public Sector, 22 GOV'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 470, 470 (Mar. 5, 1984).
In 1983, the San Jose School District became the first governmental entity
to file for bankruptcy in 40 years. San Jose School District Files for Bankruptcy; Seeks to Toss Out Pacts, 21 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 1579, 1580
(Aug. 1, 1983). The bankruptcy court initially upheld the elimination of certain wage adjustments specified in the collective bargaining agreement, Bankrupt San Jose, Calif., Schools Open on Time; Teachers Lose Raise, 21 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 1925, 1926 (Sept. 26, 1983), but the petition subsequently was dismissed, with the school board voluntarily agreeing to restore
the wage cuts, San Jose Schools Seek Dismissal of Bankruptcy Case Under
Pacts, 22 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 1081, 1081 (June 4, 1984).
167. See supra note 47.
168. A question not yet addressed by the courts is whether the contract
clause limits legislation that implements new employment terms in the absence of bargaining as well as legislation that modifies existing contract terms.
A literal interpretation of the contract clause arguably does not reach this conduct since it does not impair an express contract provision. Such an interpretation, however, would leave, no limitation at all on this type of unilateral
change because state legislatures typically are not deemed to be "public employers" and hence their actions are not circumscribed by statutory unfair labor practices provisions. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. That
a contract clause approach still may be available in such cases is suggested by a
number of recent decisions that interpret public employer pension statutes as
creating an implied contractual obligation. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices,
364 Mass. 847, 856-63, 303 N.E.2d 320, 324-28 (1973); Christensen v. Minneapolis
Mun. Employees Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 746, 749-50 (Minn. 1983).
State bargaining laws that prohibit the implementation of new employment
terms in the absence of bargaining should be similarly interpreted as creating
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STATUTORY PREEMPTION

Statutes and rules that establish substantive employment
terms independent of the collective bargaining law pose a further structural obstacle. Examples range from civil service and
teacher tenure laws to a multitude of less comprehensive provisions. 169 If these provisions are interpreted as preempting the
collective bargaining agreement, a party can avoid agreed-upon
contract terms and thereby effect unilateral change simply by
170
pointing to a conflicting statute or rule.
Although some bargaining laws provide no guidance to resolve this conflict,' 71 most contain provisions that give blanket

preemptive effect to either the collective bargaining agreement1 72 or, more frequently, the competing statute or rule. 7 3
Because the majority approach of preempting the bargaining
agreement has the potential to limit substantially the scope of
bargaining, an emerging trend in couft decisions is to accord
preemptive effect only to "statutory or regulatory provisions
which speak in the imperative and leave nothing to the discretion of the public employer.' 74 Under this test, the statute will
an implied contractual obligation that cannot be impaired without contract
clause scrutiny.
169. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 42 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978)
(teacher tenure law); MINN. STAT. §§ 44.01-.16 (1984) (municipal civil service

law).
170. For discussions of the statutory preemption issue, see Alleyne, Statutory Restraints on the Bargaining Obligation in Public Employment, in LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 100, 109-11 (A. Knapp ed. 1977);
Sackman, supra note 3, at 169-72, 179-81; Schmedemann, The Scope of Bargaining in Minnesota's Public Sector Labor Relations: A Proposalfor Change, 10
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 213, 229-39, 253-58 (1984).
171. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (West 1978 & Supp.
1984-1985); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1983). Legislative silence on the preemption issue necessarily results in uncertainty, and the
courts of various jurisdictions are split with respect to the proper scope of
mandatory bargaining under such circumstances. See Weisberger, The Appropriate Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Continuing Controversy
and the Wisconsin Experience, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 685, 740 & n.195.
172. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-10(d) (1976); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.93(3) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (state employees).
173. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540 (West 1980) (education employees);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.28 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. § 179A.20(2)
(1984); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.703 (Purdon 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
3, § 904 (1984); see also Wesclin Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 30 Ill. App. 3d
67, 76-77, 331 N.E.2d 335, 341-42 (1975) (judicial determination that statutory
dismissal procedures preempt terms of collective bargaining agreements).
174. State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 80, 393 A.2d
233, 246 (1978). For other cases following this approach, see San Mateo City
School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 850, 864-67, 663
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prevail if it expressly sets an employment term but not if it
merely establishes minimum standards or vests discretion in an
official to determine terms and conditions of employment. 175
The problem with the blanket preemption approach is that
it focuses attention on formalistic questions concerning the
existence of a conflict between a statute and a bargaining agreement rather than on whether public policy supports the unilateral or bilateral determination of a specific aspect of the
employment relationship. 176 Some employment terms, such as
teacher tenure criteria or pension contribution rates, may be so
infused with public policy or uniformity considerations that
statutory resolution is desirable. Other topics, such as job
transfer and layoff procedures, lack these strong public policy
concerns and are more appropriately determined through the
bargaining process. The blanket preemption approach not only
fails to address these variable policy considerations, but also
fosters unpredictability by encouraging litigation to test the enforceability of contract provisions to which a party no longer
wishes to be bound.
One statutory response to the weaknesses of the blanket
preemption approach is to provide that the contract supersedes
conflicting statutes once the legislative body has reviewed and
approved the contract. 77 This approach has the advantage of
permitting the legislative body to determine the preemption issue in a specific, policy-oriented context. It works well, however, only at the state employee level, where the legislative
body reviewing the contract also possesses law-making authority. Few states are likely to permit local legislative bodies to
nullify statutory provisions on an ad hoc basis. Although this
legislative approval approach eliminates the possibility of
midterm modification on preemption grounds, unpredictability
remains since the parties cannot identify accurately which subjects are appropriate for bargaining until the legislature acts on
the contract.
P.2d 523, 532-34, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809-1 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Associated

Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129,282 N.E.2d 109, 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d
17, 23 (1972); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School

Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 510, 337 A.2d 262, 270 (1975); Glendale Professional Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 103-06, 264 N.W2d 594, 601-02

(1978).
175. See, ag., State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 80-82,
393 A.2d 233, 246-47 (1978).

176. See Scbnedemann, supra note 170, at 232-33.
177. See, eg, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-278(e) (West Supp. 1984-1985)
(state employees).
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A better approach, used in three states, minimizes the unpredictability of the legislative approval approach by expressly
listing those statutes that are superseded by the bargaining obligation. 178 Such advance legislative determination requires the
legislature to balance competing policy considerations. It also
enhances predictability by delineating the range of bargainable
subjects and ensuring contract enforcement. Although this approach may initially be more burdensome for the legislature, in
the long run it is more efficient than one that continually
spawns litigation.
Special problems arise, however, when preemptive effect is
given to a municipal ordinance or an administrative regulation
adopted by a body that is also the public employer. When a
municipality or an administrative body acts in this dual capacity
of regulator and employer, preemption effectively permits it to
alter unilaterally both the scope of bargaining and its own contract obligations by the adoption of an ordinance or rule. 1 9 In
Council of New Jersey State College Locals v. State Board of
8
Higher Education,'
" for example, the board adopted regulations specifying layoff procedures in case of financial emergency without bargaining with the representatives of affected
unions.' 8 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court sustained this action even though layoff procedures were a mandatory topic of
bargaining under New Jersey law' 82 and the regulations modified layoff procedures already established by contracts entered
178. See CAi. GOV'T CODE § 3517.6 (West Supp. 1985) (state employees);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7474(f) (West 1972) (municipal employees); MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 7(d) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984). The California statute
is the most farsighted of the three in that it combines both alternatives to the
blanket preemption model. It first lists more than 120 statutory provisions
that are preempted by the bargaining obligation and then provides that contract terms supersede other statutory provisions only upon legislative approval
of the bargaining agreement. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3517.6 (West Supp. 1985).
179. See Local 1383, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Warren, 411
Mich. 642, 667, 311 N.W.2d 702, 711 (1981) (municipal regulatory preemption
would convert the Michigan bargaining law into a "local-option law");
Schmedemann, supra note 170, at 233 (local legislative preemption allows local
bodies "to opt out of the collective bargaining system altogether"). For an example of a case allowing a municipality to circumvent state bargaining law in
this manner, see Gust v. Village of Skokie, 125 Ill.
App. 3d 102, -, 465 N.E.2d
696, 698-700 (1984) (state law mandating advisory arbitration of fire-fighter disputes superseded by village ordinance prohibiting arbitration of such disputes
even though the ordinance was adopted after the union demanded arbitration).
180. 91 N.J. 18, 449 A.2d 1244 (1982).
181. Id at 23, 449 A.2d at 1246.
182. See id at 32-33, 449 A.2d at 1251-52.
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into by the board.1 8a The court acknowledged the potential for
abuse in this context but held that preemption was appropriate

because the union failed to show that the regulations were
adopted in bad faith or to avoid negotiation on mandatory subjects.184 Fortunately, most states, by either statutel a5 or case
law,

86

reject the New Jersey approach and deny preemption to

self-serving rules or ordinances adopted by an employing
entity. L8 7
As with other structural constraints, the problem with the
prevailing blanket preemption analysis is that it provides an opportunity for unilateral change beyond that justified by public
policy considerations. The answer lies in a clear and comprehensive statutory response that preserves the integrity of legislative decision making on matters of fundamental policy
without unnecessarily thwarting legitimate employee
expectations.

III. POLITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS ON PUBLIC
SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
In addition to structural obstacles, the political nature of
governmental decision making limits the scope of public sector
bargaining. The view championed by Professors Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter,lso and followed by many courts' 8 9
183.

See i- at 23 n.1, 449 A.2d at 1246 nl.

184. See i& at 28-30, 449 A.2d at 1249-50.
185. See, ag., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(f) (West 1972) (municipal employees); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-19 (1976); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 7(d)
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. § 179A.07(2) (1984); WAS&. REv.
CODE ANN. § 41.59.910 (Supp. 1985) (education employees).
186. See, eg., Local 1383, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Warren, 411
Mich. 642, 667, 311 N.W.2d 702, 711 (1981).
187. A troublesome variation of the local preemption issue occurs when the
conflict involves a local charter or civil service law amendment adopted pursuant to a voter referendum. Jurisdictions are divided as to whether the bargaining law or the referendum provision prevails in this context. Compare
San Francisco Fire Fighters, Local 798 v. Board of Supervisors, 96 Cal. App. 3d
538, 548-50, 158 CaL Rptr. 145, 150-51 (1979) (amendment to city charter approved by referendum takes precedence over bargaining law) with AFSCME
Council 75, Local 350 v. Clackamas County, 69 Or. App. 488, -, 687 P.2d 1102,
1108-11 (1984) (bargaining law prevails over civil service law providing that
changes in employment conditions be approved in a local referendum).
188. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 51, at 7-32.
189. See, eg., Charles City Community School Dist. v. Public Employment
Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d 766, 769-71 (Iowa 1979); Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n
v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ, 78 N.J. 144, 161-62, 393 A.2d 278, 286-87 (1978);
Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 81
Wis. 2d 89, 99-100, 259 N.W.2d 724, 730-31 (1977).
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and commentators, 190 is that public sector collective bargaining
must be circumscribed in order to safeguard the democratic
political process from a misallocation of political power to public sector unions at the expense of other interest groups. Wellington and Winter maintain that this misallocation is possible
because the public sector lacks the economic restraints that
naturally limit bargaining in the private sector.191 The relatively inelastic demand for government services, many of which
are essential to the public safety and welfare, 192 coupled with
the public's inability to discern the practical impact of negotiation proposals, 1 93 provides public employers with less incentive
to oppose union demands. Moreover, other commentators point
out that public sector bargaining limits the political access of
potentially adverse interest groups by excluding them from the
bilateral negotiation process. 9 4 Although avoiding distortion of
the democratic political process is a laudable objective, the development of public sector labor relations during the fiscal crisis suggests that the political process concerns have been
exaggerated.
A.

THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING:
IMPLEMENTATION

UNILATERAL

Political process considerations sometimes are embodied in
statutes that either reserve certain matters for management determination' 95 or restrict mandatory bargaining to certain enumerated items.196 More often, however, such limitations are
190.

See authorities cited supra note 51; Note, The Scope of Negotiations

Under the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act 63 IOWA L. REV. 649, 653-59
(1978).
191. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 51, at 15-17, 21-23, 30-31.
192. See id. at 21-24, 30-31.
193. See id. at 23.
194. See Corbett, supra note 51, at 255-56; Summers, supra note 51, at 1164,
1195.
195. Professor B.V.H. Schneider reported in 1979 that bargaining laws in 28
states contain "management rights" provisions that remove matters relating to
program formulation and personnel organization from the bargaining obligation. See Schneider, supra note 52, at 211. Although not infrequently seized
upon by courts to justify a broder range of exclusions, see, e.g., Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw. 229, 238,
306 A.2d 404, 409-10 (1973), rev'd, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975), these provisions do little to narrow the scope of bargaining since the topics excluded generally relate to entrepeneurial matters similarly reserved for management in
the private sector, see Alleyne, supra note 170, at 105-09.
196. Such statutes limit the scope of bargaining by expressly listing
mandatory topics of bargaining, see, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 3543.2 (West
Supp. 1985) (education employees); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West 1978); NEv.
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the result of restrictive judicial interpretations of NLRA-type
"scope of bargaining" provisions. Whatever the origin of such
limitations, reducing the number of mandatory bargaining topics permits public sector employers to implement a broader
range of measures free of the obstacles imposed by the bargaining process.
Most state bargaining laws' 97 contain language patterned
after that of section 8(d) of the NLRA, which mandates bargaining regarding "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."'198 A handful of state court decisions,
most of which were decided prior to the fiscal crisis in government, construed these state statutes in light of NLRA precedent and found that they contemplated a comparably broad
scope of bargaining. 199 Now, however, the vast majority of state
courts recognize a more limited bargaining obligation in the
public sector because of political process concerns.2° ° Indeed,
REV. STAT. § 288.150 (1979), an approach usually interpreted by the courts as
excluding those subjects not explicitly mentioned, see, e g., Charles City Community School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d 766, 77172 (Iowa 1979). But see San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 850, 858-62, 663 P.2d 523, 528-31, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 80508 (1983) (mandatory negotiation is not strictly limited to subjects listed in the
Educational Employment Relations Act but includes matters logically and reasonably related to the listed subjects).
197. See, eg., MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976);
Mic. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 423.215 (West 1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(a)
(West Supp. 1984-1985); see also Helburn, The Scope of Bargainingin Public
Sector Negotiations: Sovereignty Reviewed, 3 J. CoLLECrIvE NWoo'MIATIONS
147, 156 (1974) (70 of 81 public sector laws studied used language similar to
that in the NLRA to define the scope of bargaining) (citing Sabghir, The Scope
of Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, 33 PuBLic EiPI. RFi. Lma. 7
(Public Personnel Assoc. 1971)).
198. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
199. See, eg., Fire Fighters, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608,
615-17, 526 P.2d 971, 975-77, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 511-13 (1974); Kerrigan v. City
of Boston, 361 Mass. 24, 27-28, 278 N.E.2d 387, 390 (1972); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 52-53, 214 N.W.2d 803, 807-08
(1974). Some courts even suggested that the scope of bargaining should be
broader in the public sector because of the absence of the right to strike. See,
eg., Van Buren Public School Dist. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 61 Mich. App. 6,
27, 232 N.W-2d 278, 288 (1975).
200. See, e.g., Kenai Peninsula School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n,
572 P.2d 416, 418-23 (Alaska 1977); Charles City Community School Dist. v.
Public Employment Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d 766, 769-73 (Iowa 1979); School
Comm. v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 378 Mass. 65, 70-71, 389 N.E2d 970,
973-74 (1979); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School
Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 499-502, 337 A.2d 262, 264-65 (1975). For discussions of this
more restrictive-approach, see Sackman, supra note 3, at 181-87; Developments
in the Law-PublicEmployment 97 HARv. L. REV. 1611, 1686-93 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
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some of the "scope of bargaining" tests adopted by state courts
are quite restrictive. The North Dakota Supreme Court, for example, interpreted a state teacher bargaining law as excluding
from the scope of mandatory negotiation all terms and conditions of employment except
those relating to salary, hours, and
201
contract administration.
State courts increasingly have adopted a balancing test that
attempts to weigh the respective interests of employees and
management concerning a specific bargaining proposal. 20 2 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, held that the question of mandatory negotiation turns on "whether the impact of
the issue on the interest of the employe in wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment outweighs its probable effect on the basic policy of the system as a whole. 20° 3 If policy

concerns predominate, as in the determination of a school curriculum 2° 4 or the conditions under which a police officer may

use deadly force, 20 5 the topic is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The balancing approach thus recognizes that employee
working conditions and governmental policy concerns are not
mutually exclusive and provides a mechanism to resolve con20 6
flicts that arise between the two on a case-by-case basis.
201. See Fargo Educ. Ass'n v. Fargo Public School Dist. No. 1, 291 N.W.2d
267, 271 (N.D. 1980); see also Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188
Neb. 772, 784, 199 N.W.2d 752, 759 (1972) (mandatory topics "include only those
matters directly affecting the teacher's welfare"); Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 88 S.D. 127, 133, 215 N.W.2d 837, 841 (1974) (mandatory
topics limited to subjects that "materially affect" wages, hours, and working
conditions).
202. Clark, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain in Public Employment, in LA.
BOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 81, 92-95 (A. Knapp ed. 1977); see,

e.g., National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 753, 512 P.2d 426, 435
(1973); Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n v. Sutherlin School Dist. No. 130, 25 Or. App. 85,
88, 548 P.2d 204, 205 (1976); City of Beloit v. Employment Relations Comm'n,
73 Wis. 2d 43, 54-55, 242 N.W.2d 231, 236 (1976).
203. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist.,
461 Pa. 494, 507, 337 A.2d 262, 268 (1975).
204. See West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 581, 586,
295 A.2d 526, 534, 537 (1972); Corbett, supra note 51, at 272-74.
205. See San Jose Peace Officers Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 78 Cal. App. 3d
935, 947-49, 144 Cal. Rptr. 638, 646-47 (1978).
206. Many commentators endorse this balancing approach because it focuses on the competing policy interests relating to a specific bargaining proposal rather than on whether a topic fits within some rigid, predetermined
category. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 202, at 92-95; Corbett, supra note 51, at
250-67; Schmedemann, supra note 170, at 259-62. But cf. Alleyne, supra note
170, at 109, 114 (suggesting that a statutory list of bargainable subjects is preferable to the balancing approach because the latter permits an almost wholly
subjective determination of the scope issue).
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Although the balancing approach represents a reasonable,
policy-oriented method of dispute resolution, its application by
state courts too frequently tips the balance against negotiability. The 1982 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Local 195, IFPTE v. State2 =7 exemplifies this tendency. Even
though the United States Supreme Court had held that in the
private sector the subcontracting of unit work to another firm
for financial reasons is a mandatory subject of bargaining,08
the New Jersey court ruled that such a decision is not a
mandatory topic in the public sector because of the public employer's "unique responsibility to make and implement public
policy."20 9 The proper approach to such problems, the court
stated, is to balance the interests of the public employees and
employer.210 The court, however, obviated any need to balance
the competing interests by concluding that a topic is not negotiable even though it "intimately and directly affects the work
and welfare of public employees" if it also infringes on "government's managerial prerogative to determine policy." 2 n The
court thus rejected the majority approach 2' 2 and denied negoti207. 88 N.J. 393, 443 A.2d 187 (1982).
208. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209-15
(1964). Subcontracting has received considerable attention over the past decade as a means to provide public services at a reduced cost. For a criticism of
subcontracting, see PASSING THE BUCKS, supra note 4.
209. 88 N.J. at 402, 443 A.2d at 191.
210. See id at 404-05, 443 A.2d at 192.
211. Ic at 404-05, 443 A.2d at 192-93.
212. A slight majority of state courts rejects the conclusion of Local 195
and mandates bargaining on the financial subcontracting issue. See, eg., Van
Buren Public School Dist. v. Wayne County Circuit Judge, 61 Mich. App. 6, 2223, 232 N.W.2d 278, 290-91 (1975); General Drivers Union Local 346 v. Independent School Dist. No. 704, 283 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Minn. 1979); Saratoga
Springs City School Dist v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 68 A.D.2d 202,
208, 416 N.Y.S.2d 415, 419 (1979); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Mars
Area School Dist., 480 Pa. 295, 301, 389 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1978). These jurisdictions agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's view that "[t]he decision to
subcontract... [does] not represent a choice among alternative social or political goals or values." Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 89, 102, 259 N.W.2d 724, 732 (1977).
Nonetheless, a significant and apparently growing minority of states does
agree with the New Jersey court's position in Local 195 that public employers
need not negotiate regarding the decision to contract out. See, eg., Colonial
School Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, NCCEA, 449 A.2d 243, 248 (Del. 1982); State
Employees' Ass'n v. Public Employee Labor Relations Bd., 118 N.L 885, 88990, 397 A.2d 1035, 1037-38 (1978); AFSCME Local 1116 v. Adams County, 6
C.I.R. 367, 371-75 (Neb. Comm'n Indus. Rel. Dec. 21, 1982), noted in 21 GoV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 901 (Apr. 25, 1983); see also San Mateo City School
Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 179 Cal. Rptr. 647, 657-58 (Cal. Ct
App. 1981) (contracting out not negotiable), vacated, 33 Cal. 3d 850, 867, 663
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ability based on its determination that "[i]t is a matter of general public concern whether governmental services are
provided by government employees or by contractual arrangements with private organizations.

21 3

The New Jersey court's approach in Local 195 is flawed because it fails not only to balance the interests of public employees against those of the employer, but also to articulate
significant policy considerations that require insulating the subcontracting decision from the bargaining process. A proposal to
subcontract school transportation services as a cost-saving measure, for example, does not implicate policy choices such as
whether to provide transportation services in the first instance
or how to accomplish that task most safely. Instead, the issue
merely involves substituting private employees for public employees in order to save money. Budgetary issues of this type
are tailor-made for collective bargaining. 214 The public employee union may present a proposal that will satisfy the employer's economic concerns while preserving unit work. If the
employer is not convinced, the decision to subcontract can still
be implemented after bargaining to impasse.
The approach of the court in Local 195 accords too much
deference to the political process limitation. Although political
democracy should not be sacrificed in an attempt to emulate
the private sector model, the experience of the fiscal crisis illustrates that the feared imbalance in political power is considerably exaggerated and that significant political constraints on
public sector bargaining do exist. Indeed, over the past decade
taxpayers pressured public sector managers to resist union demands in virtually every jurisdiction. The political clout of taxpayers repeatedly dwarfed that of public sector unions as
management bargaining stances hardened and wage freezes reP.2d 523, 534, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 811 (1983) (indicating that the lower court's

test for determining mandatory bargaining subjects was too restrictive but not
specifically reaching the subcontracting issue). With respect to federal employees, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 excludes subcontracting decisions from the scope of mandatory bargaining. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(2)(B)

(1982).
213. 88 N.J. at 407, 443 A.2d at 194. The New Jersey court stated that
although the parties could agree to discuss a subcontracting decision based

solely on fiscal considerations, since New Jersey does not recognize permissive
subjects of bargaining, see infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text, they
could not agree to bargain with respect to the decision. See id. at 409, 443 A.2d
at 195.
214. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213-14
(1964); Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 89, 102-03, 259 N.W.2d 724, 732 (1977).
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Even the notion of an in-

elastic demand for government services was at least partially
debunked as government responded to public demand by reducing its level of services 21 6 The experience of those states recognizing a limited right to strike for public employees similarly
indicated that
not all governmental services are of an "essen217
tial" nature.
The public access concerns underlying the political process
limitation also appear to be overstated. In the absence of collective bargaining, public officials do not hold a referendum on
each issue they confront. Instead, they typically make decisions
unilaterally with input from various interest groups.2 1 8 The introduction of collective bargaining does not eliminate the access
of other groups to public officials. Although the public does not
participate directly in negotiation sessions,2' 9 it still has input
through lobbying, political action committees, and elections.2
Most states also require that elected legislative bodies review
and approve collective bargaining agreements, 22 with sunshine
laws mandating that this action occur in open, public meet215. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
216. See Anderson & London, supra note 4, at 381-84; Edwards, supra note
54, at 362-63.
217. See County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees
Ass'n, Local 660, 38 Cal. 3d 564, - 699 P.2d 835, 845-46, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 43435 (1985); Feuille, Selected Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration, 33
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 64, 67 (1979); Developments, supra note 200, at 171314. Even Professors Wellington and Winter concede that not all public employees perform services that are essential to the public welfare. See IL WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 51, at 25. As Professor John F. Burton, Jr.
and Charles Krider note, there is little to distinguish a strike by publicly paid
sanitation workers from one by privately paid sanitation workers in terms of
the essential nature of the services they perform. See Burton & Krider, The
Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 426
(1970).
218. See Minnesota State BI.for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. CL
1058, 1066 (1984) ("Public officials at all levels of government daily make policy decisions based only on the advice they decide they need and choose to
hear."). Commentators disagree, however, over how much influence interest
groups have on day-to-day decision making. Compare L WELLINGTON & 1.
WINTER, supra note 51, at 24 (in the normal political process an active interest
group typically can make itself heard in the decision-making process) with
Kay, supra note 64, at 155-56 (in the absence of collective bargaining, government decisions are made by a bureaucracy isolated from both public opinion
and elected officials).
219. See Talbot v. Concord Union School Dist., 114 N.H. 532. 536, 323 A.2d
912, 914 (1974). A few state statutes, hoyvever, require public access to bargaining sessions. Se4 eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.605(2) (West 1981).
220. Developments, supra note 200, at 1693.
221. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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ings.2 2 2

Some state statutes also contain innovative provisions
that require the parties to present their initial negotiation proposals at a public forum. 223 Most significant, state and local
governments generally have restructured their personnel function during the past decade in order to cope with the combined
pressures of public sector unionism and budgetary shortfalls.
This reorganization has resulted in a centralization of management authority in more publicly accountable elected officials
instead of less accessible administrators and civil service
224
commi sions.
This is not to say that political process considerations are
irrelevant in determining the scope of public sector bargaining.
To the contrary, the emerging balancing test used by courts in
determining the proper scope of bargaining recognizes the importance of political and policy concerns and provides a mechanism to weigh them against the therapeutic benefits of
collective bargaining. The critical issue, as painfully demonstrated by the New Jersey court in Local 195, is determining
what placement of the fulcrum best effectuates an accurate balancing of these competing interests.

B.

THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING: DENIAL OF CONTRACT
ENFORCEMENT

Although in the private sector2 25 and in the public sector in
most jurisdictions 226 the parties are bound by contract provisions relating to permissive topics of bargaining even though
there is no obligation to bargain over them in the first instance,
political process concerns have led a growing number of jurisdictions to restrict the enforcement of such terms. One group
of states rejects the permissive bargaining category entirely and
refuses to enforce any nonmandatory contract provision.22 7 An222. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT.
§ 471.705(1) (1984).
223. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 3523 (West 1980); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.70(4)(cm)(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
224. See Derber, supra note 69, at 90-91.
225. See, e.g., Allied Chemical Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 181 n.20 (1971); Turner v. Local 302, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
604 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1979).
226. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268,
271, 353 N.E.2d 569, 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657, 658 (1976); Springfield Educ. Ass'n v.
Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 24 Or. App. 751, 759-60, 547 P.2d 647, 650-51
(1976); Scranton School Bd. v. Scranton Fed'n of Teachers, 27 Pa. Commw.
152, 156, 365 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1976).
227. See infr notes 229-37 and accompanying text.
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other group recognizes the validity of some provisions relating
to permissive subjects but refuses to enforce others on public
policy grounds.22s The result under either approach is to expand the range of illegal bargaining subjects in the public sector and increase the likelihood of unilateral contract
modification.

At least four states have eliminated the permissive bargaining category for the public sector by either statute22 or decim 0 For example, in the New Jersey case of Ridgefield
sion.
Park EducationAssociation v. Ridgefield Park Board of Education,2' the collective bargaining agreement at issue contained a
provision designed to minimize involuntary transfers and reassignments.2 32 After the board of education involuntarily reassigned a number of teachers, the union filed grievances alleging
noncompliance with the contract. The board refused to submit
the grievances to arbitration, claiming that the contract provision covered a nonmandatory topic and, therefore, was invalid.233 The Public Employment Relations Commission
acknowledged the nonmandatory nature of the topic but asserted the majority rule that a contract provision relating to a
permissive subject is nonetheless enforceable.2
The New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed, construing the state bargaining
law as encompassing only two categories of bargaining subjects:
mandatory topics and nonnegotiable matters of governmental
policy.
The court held that subjects falling within the second
category were beyond the scope of bargaining, making contract
terms pertaining to them unenforceable even if voluntarily
228. See infra notes 238-49 and accompanying text.
229.

See CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 3543.2(a) (West Supp. 1985) (stating that

those subjects not specifically enumerated in the statute "are reserved to the
public school employer and may not be a subject of meeting and negotiating");
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1984) (although not expressly banning per-

missive bargaining, accomplishing essentially the same result by listing a multiplicity of subjects regarding which bargaining is prohibited).
230. See Colonial School Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, NCCEA, 449 A.2d 243,
248 (Del. 1982); Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78
N.J. 144, 162, 393 A.2d 278, 287 (1978).

231.
232.
233.
234.

78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978).
Id at 150, 393 A.2d at 280-8L
Id. at 150-51, 393 A.2d at 28L
Id. at 152-53, 393 A.2d at 281-82. The Commission's decision was based,

in part, on an interpretation of legislative amendments enacted after an earlier
case, Dunellen B&d of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 3M A.2d 737

(1978), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court had rejected the permissive
category. See Ridgefield Park,78 N.J. at 152, 393 A.2d at 282.
235. See Ridgefield Park, 78 N.J. at 162, 393 A.2d at 287.
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agreed upon by the parties. 236 The court maintained that the
alternative of leaving such issues to government negotiators
would strip the public of its proper oversight role and thereby
'
endanger "the very foundation of representative democracy. "237
The courts in Massachusetts and New York recognize a
similar but less restrictive limitation on contract enforcement.
In these jurisdictions, the permissive category is not entirely
abolished, but contract enforcement is denied if, as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put it, "the ingredient of public policy in the issue subject to dispute is . . . comparatively
heavy."2 38 This "ingredient of public policy," although typically
found in a statutory delegation of managerial authority to a
public employer, 239 also may be derived from other statutes,
case law, or nonlegal sources. 24 ° The Massachusetts and New
York courts have relied on the public policy limitation during
the past decade to deny enforcement of a considerable number
of contract terms, including a just cause standard for the dismissal of nontenured teachers, 24 1 job security clauses, 242 and an
agreement limiting access to teacher personnel files. 243 When
236. See id.
237. Id at 163, 393 A.2d at 287. The court explained:
A private employer may bargain away as much or as little of its managerial control as it likes....

However, the very foundation of repre-

sentative democracy would be endangered if decisions on significant
matters of governmental policy were left to the process of collective
negotiation, where citizen participation is precluded. This Court
would be most reluctant to sanction collective agreement on matters
which are essentially managerial in nature, because the true managers are the people. Our democratic system demands that governmental bodies retain their accountability to the citizenry.
Id (citation omitted).
238. School Comm. v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 378 Mass. 65, 71,
389 N.E.2d 970, 973 (1979).
239. See, e.g., Port Jefferson Station Teachers Ass'n v. Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union Free School Dist., 45 N.Y.2d 898, 899, 383 N.E.2d 553, 554, 411
N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1978); Note, The Emerging Public Policy Limitation on Public
Sector Collective Bargaining,42 ALB. L. REv. 121, 132 (1977).
240. See, e.g., School Comm. v. Curry, 369 Mass. 683, 685, 343 N.E.2d 144,
145 (1976); Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley
Teachers' Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 616-17, 339 N.E.2d 132, 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427,
429 (1975).
241. See School Comm. v. West Bridgewater Teachers' Ass'n., 372 Mass.
121, 122, 360 N.E.2d 886, 887 (1977); Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 775, 358 N.E.2d 878, 879, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (1976).
242. See Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm., 386 Mass. 197,
212, 434 N.E.2d 1258, 1267 (1982); School Comm. v. Curry, 369 Mass. 683, 685,
343 N.E.2d 144, 145 (1976).
243. See Board of Educ. v. Areman, 41 N.Y.2d 527, 534, 362 N.E.2d 943, 948,
394 N.Y.S.2d 143, 148 (1977).
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public policy concerns are not so "comparatively heavy," however, nonmandatory contract terms have been enforced.2 44
In Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Committee,245
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusettts explained the
public policy limitation on the public employer's scope of bargaining authority as being "necessary in order that the collective actions of public employees do not distort the normal
political process for controlling public policy." 24 6 The collective
bargaining agreement in Boston Teachers Union contained a job
security clause prohibiting the dismissal of any tenured teacher
or nurse for a two-year period, admittedly a nonmandatory
topic of bargaining.247 The Massachusetts court concluded that
the provision impermissibly restricted the ability of the School
Committee to determine the size of its teaching staff on an annual basis and refused to enforce the contract provision as written.2 48 The court did, however, hold that the job security
provision was enforceable for a one-year period, explaining that
the public interest in protecting the managerial prerogative diminishes after the annual budget is established. 249 The net result was a revised contract term never agreed on by the parties
but judicially imposed based on the court's own conception of
desirable public policy.
These restrictions on contract enforcement have a superficial, theoretical appeal that has found increasing support in the
scholarly literature.2 0 Commentators note that private sector
244. See ag., School Comm. v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 372 Mass.
605, 613-16, 363 N.E.2d 485, 489-91 (1977) (educational policy aspects of arbitra-

tion award relating to appointment of trustees to teachers' health and welfare
fund, resolving dispute over severance pay, and providing for remedial reading
program not so heavy as to preclude its enforcement); Onteora Central School
Dist. v. Onteora Non-Teaching Employees Ass'n, 56 N.Y.2d 769, 771-75, 437
N.E.2d 281, 282-4, 452 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23-24 (1982) (upholding arbitral award
compensating union members for the wages foregone because of the district's
use of voluntary custodial help and contracting out of certain bus runs for athletic events).
245. 386 Mass. 197, 434 N.E.2d 1258 (1982).
246. Id-at 211, 434 N.E.2d at 1266. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that "[b]oards of education are but representatives of the public interest and the public interest must, certainly at times, bind these

representatives and limit or restrict their power to, in turn, bind the public
which they represent." Board of Educ. v. Areman, 41 N.Y.2d 527, 531, 362
N.E.2d 943, 946, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143, 146 (1977).

247.
248.
249.
250.

See Boston Teachers Union, 386 Mass. at 200-01, 434 N.E.2d at 126L
See id. at 212, 434 N.E.2d at 1267.
See id at 213, 434 N.E.2d at 1267-68.
A number of commentators disapprove of the permissive category in

public sector bargaining. See, eg., Kilberg, supra note 51, at 189; Sackman,
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contract enforcement rules applicable to nonmandatory terms
cannot be transplanted to the public sector because the principal limitation on public sector bargaining is political rather
than economic.251 Although a private employer's voluntary
agreement to negotiate on a matter of managerial prerogative
affects only the employer's economic self-interest in managing
the enterprise, a public employer's agreement to negotiate on a
topic excluded from mandatory negotiation as a matter of fundamental policy concern represents a waiver of the public's
right to have such issues determined through the normal political process. Using such reasoning, commentators contend that
nonmandatory topics infused with public policy concerns
should be excluded from voluntary as well as mandatory
252
negotiation.
Despite this attempted theoretical justification, the contract enforcement limitations are perhaps the most objectionable of all the expanded unilateral change possibilities in the
public sector. Judicial application of the contract enforcement
limitations in the midcontract setting raises serious fairness
questions because such limitations undermine legitimate employee expectations without requiring any showing as to the necessity or reasonableness of the modification. Contract terms
obtained through concessions on other bargaining proposals are
simply invalidated on nebulous public policy grounds with no
opportunity for renegotiation. As illustrated by the Boston
Teachers decision, the practical result of these enforcement restrictions is the substitution of judicially imposed contract
25 3
terms for those negotiated by the parties.
Quite apart from the fairness issues, however, the contract
enforcement limitations increase uncertainty in bargaining. Because of the imprecise balancing standard for determining the
scope of mandatory bargaining, public employers and employees have little guidance in ascertaining whether a contract term
will survive an enforcement challenge. This problem is aggrasupra note 3, at 189-90; Summers, supra note 51, at 1193-94. Professor William
L. Corbett, who instead favors an approach similar to that adopted in Massachusetts and New York, differentiates nonmandatory topics that should be voluntarily negotiable because they affect only the managerial interests of the
public employer from those topics that should be excluded entirely from the
negotiation process because they involve matters of general public interest.
See Corbett, supra note 51, at 275-78.
251. See, e.g., Sackman, supra note 3, at 189.
252. See i&; Corbett, supra note 51, at 275-77; Summers, supra note 51, at
1193.
253. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
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vated in Massachusetts and New York, where enforcement depends on a highly subjective judicial assessment of whether
public policy concerns are "comparatively heavy."2
As the
concurring opinion in one New York decision pointed out, the
public policy limitation "hold[s] out an 'open sesame' of hope to
those who would have the court contravene the well-recognized
statutory preference for bargaining and arbitrating ... and

will but encourage proliferation of litigation rather than composition of differences in public employment disputes."2
These enforcement limitations also have a detrimental impact on the role of the public employer in terms of decreased
management flexibility. For example, a public employer may
find it advantageous to accept a limited job security provision in
exchange for a reduced compensation package. The potential
invalidity of the nonmandatory job security clause, however, effectively removes this flexibility. If an elected official or legislative body close to the negotiation process believes that such a
trade-off is in the public interest, it is difficult to understand
why a contrary judicial assessment of the same policy question
should have preemptive effect.
Reduced to their essence, the contract enforcement restrictions are grounded in the paternalistic notion that public sector
managers are incapable of representing the public interest in
collective bargaining. 2 -6 Admittedly, many public sector managers were not prepared to cope with the initial onslaught of
public sector unioiism in the 1960's and early 1970's.2 7 But
this difficulty had less to do with inherent political process limitations than with the prevailing inefficiency of public sector
personnel management, characterized as it was by diffused
2
management authority and an archaic civil service system. M
Public employers have made great strides during the past decade to improve personnel management. In order to contend
with public sector unionism and financial retrenchment, gov254. See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.

255. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n., 37 N.Y.2d 614, 618, 339 N.E.2d 132, 135, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427, 431 (1975)
(Fuchsberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
256. See, eg., IL WELLINGTON & . WINTER, supra note 51, at 22-23, 31;
Sackinan, supra note 3, at 189-90.
257. See Raskin, supra note 3, at 203-05.
258. See Derber, supra note 69, at 80-90; Shaw & Clark, The PracticalDifferences Between Public and PrivateSector Collective Bargaining, 19 UCLA
L. REV. 867, 870 (1972); Wollett, State Government-Strategiesfor Negotiations in an Austere Environment: A Management Peripective, 27 LAB. L.J.
504, 505 (1976).
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ernmental bodies restructured and centralized management authority,-59 trained negotiators, and developed comprehensive
bargaining strategies.26 0

The pressures of economic scarcity

thus led to a management approach in the public sector that
more closely parallels that of the private sector.26 1 Restrictions
on contract enforcement inhibit this trend toward more efficient and accountable personnel management and relegate both
public employers and employees to a second-class status.
State and local government officials are entrusted with
considerable responsibility in deciding issues of health, safety,
and welfare with a minimum of judicial interference. If an
elected school board contracts for educational supplies, the
courts will not invalidate the contract on abstract policy
grounds in the absence of a constitutional or statutory violation.
The willingness of the courts to adopt a more interventionist
role with respect to public employee coptracts suggests that the
sovereignty and "extra loyalty" doctrines are far from extinct.
C.

POSTCONTRACT UNILATERAL CHANGE

Virtually all jurisdictions carry over to the public sector
the private sector rule extending the unilateral change proscription to the postcontract setting, prohibiting an employer
from unilaterally altering the status quo concerning mandatory
bargaining topics, whether established by an expired contract
or by past practice, without first bargaining to impasse. 262 The
fiscal crisis, however, has led to a reexamination of whether the
private sector notion of a "dynamic" status quo should apply in
the public sector and of the appropriate timing for implementing adjustments in employment terms.
Public sector unilateral change in the postcontract setting
was first addressed comprehensively by the New York Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) in Tiborough Bridge &
Tunnel Authority. 63 In Tiborough, the parties had entered
259. See Derber, supra note 69, at 90-93; Kay, supra note 64, at 160-61.
260. See Anderson & London, supra note 4, at 409-10; Horton, supra note 1,
at 199-200; Weisberger, supra note 171, at 709.
261. See Horton, supra note 1, at 201.
262. See, e.g., Lane v. Board of Directors, 447 A.2d 806, 809-10 (Me. 1982);
Galloway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Township Educ. Ass'n, 78 N.J.
25, 48-49, 393 A.2d 218, 230 (1978); Appeal of Cumberland Valley School Dist.,
483 Pa. 134, 142-43, 394 A.2d 946, 950-51 (1978). Some state bargaining laws expressly require the maintenance of expired contract terms during negotiations
for a successor agreement. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-475 (West
Supp. 1984) (municipal employees).
263. 5 P.E.R.B. 1 3037 (N.Y. PERB July 28, 1972). For discussions of the
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into a series of two-year collective bargaining agreements providing for annual incremental salary increases. 264 Following
expiration of one of these contracts, the Bridge and Tunnel Authority maintained the salary levels effective on the date the
contract expired, refusing to grant salary increases during negotiations for a new agreement.2 In holding that the Authority's
conduct violated the statutory bargaining obligation, the PERB
embraced the private sector rule that an employer must maintain the status quo concerning mandatory topics even after exThe PERB noted that, as in the
piration of the contract.3
the status quo had to be viewed dynamically;,
private sectori
an employer is obligated not only to maintain benefit levels
reached at the time the contract terminates, but also to provide
periodic adjustments as contemplated by the expired contract.m The PERB further explained that the presence of
mandatory impasse resolution procedures in the public sector
delays the point at which the employer can take unilateral action because an employer must exhaust such mandatory procedures as mediation and fact-finding before a true impasse
269

occurs.

A minority of jurisdictions refuses to follow the Triborough
approach.2 0 In fact, the dynamic status quo mandate of TriborTriborough decision and its subsequent application in New York, see Boyce,

New York's Triborough Doctrine: UnilateralChanges in the Terms and Conditions ofEmployment During a ContractualHiatus in the Public Sector, 9 J.
CoLLEcrivE NEGOTiATiONS 361 (1980); Note, The Effect of New York's Tribor-

ough Law on PublicSector Labor Negotiation, 48 ALB. L REV. 459 (1984).
264.

Triborough, 5 P.E--RLB. at 3064.

265. Id.
266.

See id. at 3064-65. The PERB decision affirmed the ruling of the hear-

ing officer, who contended that the duty to refrain from unilateral change during negotiations should be applied more stringently in the public sector than in
the private sector because of the absence of the right to strike in the former.
4505, 4522 (N.Y. PERB
See Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 5 P.E.R.B.

Apr. 24, 1972).
267. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
268. See Triborough,5 P.E.R.B. at 3065.
269. See id.
270. See, eg., M.S.D. No. 43 Teachers' Ass'n v. M.S.A.D. No. 43 Bd. of Directors, 432 A.2d 395, 397 & n.3 (Me. 1981) (quoting Easton Teachers Ass'n v.
Easton School Comm., M.L.ILB. No. 79-14 (1979)); Pinellas County Police Be-

nevolent Ass'n v. City of St. Petersburg, 3 F.P.E.RL 205, 208 (Fla. PERC 19Th,
discussed in City of Ocala v. Marion County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 392 So.
2d 26, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); see also New Castle County Vocational
Technical Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 451 A.2d 1156,1163-64 (Del. Ch. 1982)
(denying temporary injunction sought to restrain employer from failing to pay
insurance premium increases because plaintiff did not demonstrate irreparable
harm).
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ough was temporarily rejected in New York itself. In Board of
Cooperative EducationalServices v. New York Public Employment Relations Board (BOCES),271 the New York Court of Appeals stated that although maintenance of the status quo is one
thing, "to say that the status quo includes a change and means
automatic increases in salary is another. '272 Concerned with
the fiscal pressures plaguing public sector employees, the court
noted that "[t]he concept of continual successive annual increments... is tied into either constantly burgeoning growth and
prosperity ... or a continuing generally inflationary spiral"

and that such automatic increases are inappropriate during
times of "escalating costs and diminishing tax bases." 273 Continuing to give salary increases during the negotiation process,
the court observed, would tip the balance of power in favor of
employees because of the practical difficulty of recouping or
limiting increases already received, thereby reducing employee
incentive to negotiate a successor agreement. 274 A recent statutory modification of New York bargaining law, however, apparently has undercut the holding in BOCES.2 5
Those courts and state labor boards adhering to the Triborough view emphasize that the policy reasons supporting the dynamic status quo rule in the private sector apply equally in the
public sector.2 76 For example, in both sectors the elimination of
271.

41 N.Y.2d 753, 363 N.E.2d 1174, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1977).

272. 1d. at 758, 363 N.E.2d at 1177, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
273. 1d at 758, 363 N.E.2d at 1177, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 442-43.
274. See id.
275. A 1982 amendment to New York's Taylor Act made it an improper
practice for a public employer "to refuse to continue all the terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated." N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW
§ 209-a(1)(e) (McKinney 1983). The ambiguous wording of this amendment
could have been interpreted either as codifying existing law or as overruling
the BOCES decision by mandating maintenance of a dynamic status quo. New
York's PERB adopted the later interpretation, and its decision has been affirmed by the New York courts. See Cobleskill Cent. School Dist., 16 P.E.R.B.
4501, at 4506 (N.Y. PERB 1983), affd, 105 A.D.2d 564, 481 N.Y.S.2d 795
(1984), appeal denied, 64 N.Y.2d 1071, 478 N.E.2d 248, 489 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1985);
Note, supra note 263, at 481-90.
276. See, e.g., Appeal of Cumberland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 141,
394 A.2d 946, 950 (1978). The dynamic status quo concept has been applied to
require wage increases consistent either with an expired contract, see, e.g., Indiana Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Mill Creek Classroom Teachers
Ass'n,

-

Ind.

-,

-

456 N.E.2d 709, 713 (1983); Local 1467, Int'l Ass'n of

Firefighters v. City of Portage, 134 Mich. App. 466, 474, 352 N.W.2d 284, 288
(1984); Galloway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Township Educ. Ass'n, 78
N.J. 25, 51-52, 393 A.2d 218, 232 (1978), or with past practice, see, e.g., City of
Ocala v. Marion County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 392 So. 2d 26, 30-31 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980), and to require the increased employer premium contribu-
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anticipated compensation adjustments during the negotiation
process is disruptive of labor peace, tips the balance of bargaining power in favor of the employer, and frustrates the objective
of establishing terms and conditions of employment through
bargainingT T Moreover, the potential for economic hardship,
which is present in both sectors, should be addressed directly
through the bargaining process rather than used as an excuse
to avoid bargaining. Public sector employers, like their private
sector counterparts, can protect their economic interests
through tough bargaining stances and contract provisions that
expressly limit compensation adjustments to the contract
period.278
In at least one respect, however, the public and private sectors differ substantially. Most public sector bargaining laws
contain mandatory impasse resolution procedures as a partial
replacement for the right to strike.279 Many of these statutory
schemes are quite elaborate, requiring sequential resort to mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration.289 If, as in Triborough,the
exhaustion of these procedures is a prerequisite to unilateral
action, an employer's ability to alter prior contractual arrangements may be delayed significantly. In fact, in those jurisdictions with compulsory impasse arbitration, 281 the power of
tions needed to maintain existing employee insurance coverage, see, e.g., Smith
County Educ. Ass'n v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328, 338 (Tenn. 1984).
The Oregon Employment Relations Board has required that during the
contract hiatus period employers absorb the cost of increased insurance provisions, see Multnomah County Educ. Serv. Dist. & MCESD Educ. Ass'n, 6
P.E.C.B.R. 5341, 5348-49 (Or. ERB Aug. 4, 1982), noted in 986 GOV'T EbIPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 19 (Nov. 1, 1982), but not that of merit pay increases, see Oregon Nurses Ass'n v. Polk County, 6 P.E.C.B.R. 5426, 5433 (Or. ERB Oct. 27,
1982), noted in 21 GOV'T EmPiL. REL. REP. (BNA) 176 (Jan. 24, 1983).
277. See Galloway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Township Educ.
Ass'n, 78 N.J. 25, 49-50, 393 A.2d 218, 230-31 (1978); Multnomah County Educ.
Service Dist. & MCEDS Educ. Ass'n, 6 P.E.C.B.R. 5341, 5349 (Or. ERB Aug. 4,
1982), noted in 986 GOV'T EmPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 19 (Nov. 1, 1982).
278. See M.S.A.D. No. 43 Teachers' Ass'n v. M.S.A.D. No. 43 Bd. of Directors, 432 A.2d 395, 398 (Me. 1981) (describing contract provision that specifically limits duration of salary schedule to contract term).
279. See Schneider, supra note 52, at 200-07.
280. See, eg., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.19-.22 (West 1978); WLs. STAT. ANN.
§ iii.70(4)(c) (West 1974 & Supp. 1984-1985) (municipal employees).
281. Impasse, or interest, arbitration occurs when the parties at the bargaining table are unable to agree to the terms of a new contract and the matter is submitted to an arbitrator. This should be distinguished from the more
traditional grievance arbitration, which involves the determination of the
rights of the parties under an existing contract. IL EDwARDS, R. CLARK & C.
CRAVER, supra note 2, at 666.
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unilateral implementation may be completely eliminated. 2 2
Recent decisions in Massachusetts and California illustrate two
contrasting responses to the problem posed by lengthy impasse
resolution procedures.
In Massachusetts and Massachusetts Organization of State
Engineers and Scientists,2 8 3 the Massachusetts Labor Relations
Commission held that an employer's unilateral implementation
of new "work rules" after a deadlock in negotiations, but prior
to the completion of fact-finding procedures, did not violate the
duty to bargain.2s 4 The Commission explained that the exhaustion of mediation and fact-finding typically occurs several
months, and occasionally years, after the parties are genuinely
deadlocked. 285 To delay unilateral action for such an extended
period would unduly restrict the employer's ability to act. 280
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the Commission's conclusion, noting that many private
sector decisions recognize that the use of economic weapons to
resolve an impasse is not inconsistent with a good faith willingness to bargain. 2 7 The court thus viewed unilateral change in
the impasse resolution context as a pressure tactic permitted in
the public sector just as strikes and lockouts are in the private
sector.
The California Court of Appeals took a different view of
the propriety of unilateral change as a response to the delay resulting from impasse resolution procedures in Moreno Valley
Unified School District v. Public Employment Relations
Board.2m The California court rejected the argument that post282. See Edwards, supra note 63, at 923-27.
283. No. SUP-2497 (Mass. LRC Mar. 22, 1982), noted in 966 GOV'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 20 (June 7, 1982).
284. See id., slip op. at 12-15. The Michigan Employment Relations Commission followed a similar approach in upholding a college's implementation of
its last best wage offer after talks had come to an impasse but before a factfinding hearing was held. See Southwestern Mich. College and Local 586,
SEIU, 1979 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. 908, 909-11, 916-19 (Mich. ERC Oct. 22, 1979),
noted in 847 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 18 (Feb. 4, 1980). The MERC,
however, recently overruled its decision in Southwestern Mich. College and
adopted the majority rule that an employer acts unlawfully by implementing a
change in employment terms prior to the completion of fact-finding procedures. See County of Wayne and Council 25, AFSCME, Case Nos. C83 G-206,
C83 H-253, slip op. at 2 (Mich. ERC Dec. 12, 1984).
285. See Massachusetts Org. of State Engineers, No. SUP-2497, slip op. at 12.
286. See id at 12-13.
287. See Massachusetts Org. of State Engineers & Scientists v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 389 Mass. 920, 928, 452 N.E.2d 1117, 1122 (1983).
288. 142 Cal. App. 3d 191, 191 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1983); accord Wasco County v.
AFSCME, Local No. 2752, 46 Or. App. 859, 865-66, 613 P.2d 1067, 1071 (1980)
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contract unilateral change is the equivalent of such other economic weapons as strikes or lockouts. 289 The court recognized
that unilateral change does not merely exert pressure on the
other party to reach agreement, but effectively forecloses bargaining on the disputed issue by imposing the desired result.290
Although acknowledging that postimpasse unilateral change is
lawful in the private sector, the court explained that the California mandatory impasse procedures at issue constituted a conUnilateral
tinuation of the bilateral negotiation process.3'
change prior to the exhaustion of the postimpasse procedures
thus frustrates the goal of resolving employment disputes
through collective bargaining just as it does in the preimpasse
setting. 2 Finally, the court observed that unilateral action tips
the negotiating balance in favor of the employer and thus
reduces the employer's incentive to participate actively in the
3
impasse resolution process.2
Although the existence of mandatory impasse procedures
places public employers at a disadvantage relative to their private sector counterparts, the majority approach exemplified by
Tn borough appears to be the superior one. So long as
mandatory impasse procedures are used to extend the public
sector negotiation process, it is difficult to justify unilateral action prior to exhaustion. An obvious solution would be for
more states to give employees a limited right to strike2' rather
than relying on fact-finding and arbitration. This approach not
only would permit public employers to implement unilateral
action at an earlier point, but would ease concerns about the
chilling effect of compulsory arbitration9 5 and its lack of polit(affirming cease and desist order barring county from implementing its last
proposed wage increase before completion of fact-finding); see supra note 284
(describing switch to this position in Michigan).
289. See Moreno Valley, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 197-98, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 64-65.
290. See id. at 197-98, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 65; see also NLRB v. Katz, 369 US.
736, 747 (1962) ("Unilateral action by an employer without prior discussion
with the union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional policy.").
29L See 142 Cal. App. 3d at 199; 191 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
292. See id.
293. See i&.at 198-200, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
294. See supra note 52.
295. Many commentators suggest that the availability of arbitration as a
"safety net" and the tendency of arbitrators to adopt compromise solutions inhibits the voluntary resolution of labor disputes through negotiation. See e g.,
I. WELLINGTON AND R WINTEi, supra note 51, at 179-80; Feuille, Final Offer
Arbitration and the Chilling Effec, 14 INDus. REL. 302, 304 (1975); Wheeler,
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ical accountability. 296

CONCLUSION
Although most jurisdictions apply the core private sector
unilateral change principles to the public sector, the opportunities for unilateral change in the public sector clearly exceed
those available in the private sector. Some of these restrictions
on public sector bargaining are, of course, appropriate. Government must be able to take prompt action in the public interest
during a fiscal emergency. Considerations of both governmental structure and political accountability justify a two-step contract ratification process for public sector management that
focuses increased responsibility in elected legislative bodies.
Admittedly, topics in which fundamental policy concerns overshadow employee interests are best determined outside of the
bilateral collective bargaining process. Nonetheless, public sector unilateral change during the fiscal crisis exceeded the legitimate bounds of the structural and political process constraints.
In the structural context, some of the problem lies in a lack of
legislative attention to appropriate roles and procedures. In the
political process context, the presence of genuine, although frequently overemphasized, concerns with the fiscal integrity of
government is partly responsible for this differential treatment.
More disturbing than these justifications, however, is the
recurring theme in cases sanctioning public sector unilateral
change that public sector bargaining is an aberration that need
be tolerated only when convenient or when its results are not
too painful. This view seems to underlie decisions that provide
a lesser degree of protection to public employee contracts than
to other contracts made by the government. A similar attitude
emanates from decisions that attempt to justify unilateral action because of the special relationship between government
and its employees or the inability of public employers to represent the public interest in collective negotiations. These perspectives afford both public employees and employers a secondclass status and suggest that incantations of public policy rationales too frequently mask a reinvigoration of the sovereignty
How Compulsory Arbitration Affects Compromise Activity, 17 INDUS. REL. 80,
84 (1978).
296. See Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 412 v. City of Dearborn,
394 Mich. 229, 241-42, 231 N.W.2d 226, 228 (1975); Grodin, Political Aspects of
Public Sector Interest Arbitration,64 CAL. L. REV. 678, 680-83 (1976).
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and "extra loyalty" theories, long viewed as paternalistic and
outmoded.
The current trend with respect to unilateral change in the
public sector appears to be headed in two opposite directions.
Structural constraints on contract enforcement are ebbing as an
increasing number of state legislatures seek to eliminate unnecessary conflicts between collective bargaining laws and other
statutory provisions. Unilateral change based on political process grounds, however, is on the rise, although this trend is not
universal. A definite gulf is emerging between some states,
such as New Jersey, in which limitations on public sector bargaining are proliferating, and other states, such as California,
which govern public sector unilateral change according to rules
resembling those applicable in the private sector. This diversity
reflects not only varying degrees of commitment to public sector bargaining, but also economic reality, with the more financially troubled states of the industrial northeast showing a
greater receptiveness to unilateral change.
Although the fiscal crisis provided much of the impetus for
the expansion of unilateral change on political process grounds,
the practical experience of this period undermines much of the
theoretical basis for this phenomenon. The taxpayer revolt and
the shrinking clout of public sector unions during the fiscal crisis illustrate that definite constraints on bargaining do exist in
the public sector. The aggressive response of public sector
management and the increasing centralization of authority in
more publicly visible officials belie the notion that public employers cannot represent the public interest in collective bargaining. Just as the explosive growth in public sector unionism
during the 1960's and early 1970's largely discredited the sovereignty and "extra loyalty" doctrines, the practical experience
gained during the painful decade of financial retrenchment now
challenges much of the validity of the more modern theoretical
constraints on the public sector bargaining process. Public sector bargaining matured during the fiscal crisis into a closer approximation of the private sector model, and public sector
unilateral change rules should be reexamined accordingly.

